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Rafael I. Pardo*  
Abstract 
During the three decades following the enactment of the 
Bankruptcy Code, courts and commentators have been vexed by the 
problem of determining the present value of future payments to creditors 
proposed in a debtor’s repayment plan. The issue central to this 
problem has been the discount rate to be applied when conducting 
present-value analysis. While the Code unmistakably requires the 
discounting of future payments as part of the process for confirming a 
repayment plan, the Code does not explicitly specify the rate itself or the 
manner in which the rate should be calculated. 
No uniform rule of decision has emerged on this issue. Instead, a 
multitude of approaches has proliferated within and across circuits. 
Not even the Supreme Court has been able to bring uniformity to bear 
on the issue. When given the opportunity to do so in 2004, the Court in 
Till v. SCS Credit Corp.1  could muster only a plurality opinion. In the 
wake of Till, disarray over the discount-rate calculus continues to 
abound. 
The main goal of this Article is to reconceptualize present-value 
analysis in consumer bankruptcy. It argues that, as a positive matter, 
the Bankruptcy Code compels use of a discount rate that solely accounts 
for expected inflation, but that does not take into account opportunity 
cost or the risk of nonpayment. The Article also examines whether the 
* Professor of Law, University of Washington. For helpful comments and 
suggestions, I am grateful to Robert Ahdieh, Joanna Shepherd Bailey, William Buzbee, 
William Carney, David Epstein, David Hoffman, Timothy Holbrook, Michael Kang, 
Margaret Lemos, Jonathan Nash, Charles O’Kelley, the Honorable Pamela Pepper, 
Lawrence Ponoroff, Frederick Tung, and Kathryn Watts. This Article has also benefited 
greatly from the commentary of participants at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Canadian 
Law and Economics Association and at faculty workshops at Emory University School of 
Law; the University of California, Irvine School of Law; and the University of Washington 
School of Law. 
1. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
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doctrinal prescription for the application of an inflation discount rate is 
normatively desirable. The Article concludes that, not only does an 
inflation rate comport with generally held theory of bankruptcy law’s 
procedural and substantive goals, it also optimizes the statutory design 
of the Bankruptcy Code and the institutional design of the bankruptcy 
courts. 
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I. Introduction 
During the three decades following the enactment of the Bankruptcy 
Code,2  courts and commentators have been vexed by the problem of 
determining the present value of future payments to creditors proposed in a 
debtor’s repayment plan. The issue central to this problem has been the 
discount rate to be applied when conducting present-value analysis. While 
the Code unmistakably requires the discounting of future payments as part 
of the process for confirming a repayment plan, the Code does not 
explicitly specify the rate itself or the manner in which the rate should be 
calculated. 
No uniform rule of decision has emerged on this issue. Instead, a 
multitude of approaches has proliferated within and across circuits.3  The 
lack of uniformity has generated a great deal of criticism, including that 
from the National Bankruptcy Review Commission (NBRC), which 
Congress authorized in 1994 to evaluate and recommend revisions to the 
Bankruptcy Code.4  In its final report in 1997, the NBRC recommended that 
the discount rate for present-value analysis "should be determined using a 
2. This Article uses the terms "Bankruptcy Code" and "Code" to refer to the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended 
primarily at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532 (2006)). 
3. See infra notes 22–24 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which 
intercircuit and intracircuit splits culminated in the Till decision). 
4. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 603, 108 Stat. 4106, 
4147 (listing the duties of the NBRC). 
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nationally recognized rate to promote the equal treatment of similarly 
situated debtors and creditors,"5  but it failed to specify a particular rate.6 
Not even the Supreme Court has been able to bring uniformity to bear 
on the issue. When given the opportunity to do so in 2004, the Court in Till 
v. SCS Credit Corp. could muster only a plurality opinion.7  In the wake of 
Till, disarray over the discount-rate calculus continues to abound. Pursuant 
to the test for determining the holding of a fragmented Court as articulated 
in Marks v. United States,8  one court has concluded that no single standard 
exists that legitimately constitutes the narrowest ground for the plurality 
and concurring opinions in Till, such that no binding precedent resulted.9  In 
contrast, another court applying the Marks test has reached the opposite 
conclusion.10  And, making matters more interesting, the Fifth Circuit has 
held that, for a case involving a factual scenario identical to that presented 
in Till, the plurality opinion in Till constitutes binding authority (thus 
rendering the Marks test inapplicable).11  Clearly, the issue of how to 
conduct present-value analysis in bankruptcy remains unsettled. 
To be sure, some of the blame for this doctrinal mess falls on Congress 
for its repeated failure to specify the discount rate that a court ought to use 
in its present-value analysis.12  But the rest of the blame falls on courts and 
5. 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 261 
(1997). 
6. Id. 
7. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
8. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) ("When a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, 
‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who 
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds . . . .’" (omission in original) (quoting 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976))). 
9. See In re Cook, 322 B.R. 336, 341 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) ("The lack of a legal 
rationale shared by five Justices leads to the inescapable conclusion that Till does not 
produce binding precedent."). For commentary arguing that, under the Marks narrowest-
ground test, Till did not produce binding precedent, see April E. Knight, Recent 
Development, Balancing the Till: Finding the Appropriate Cram Down Rate in Bankruptcy 
Reorganizations After Till v. SCS Credit Corporation, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1015, 1026–27 
(2005). 
10. See In re Flores, No. 05-38630/JWH, 2006 WL 4452973, at *7 (Bankr. D.N.J. 
Mar. 29, 2006) (observing that, pursuant to the Marks test, the legal standard for calculating 
present value can be ascertained from the plurality and concurring opinions in Till). 
11. See Drive Fin. Servs., L.P. v. Jordan, 521 F.3d 343, 349 (5th Cir. 2008) ("Drive 
Financial’s reliance on Marks is misplaced in this case because we are presented with 
essentially the same facts that the Supreme Court was presented with in Till."). 
12. In its most recent overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code in 2005, Congress did nothing 
to address the discount-rate calculus, with the exception of instructing a court to defer to 
nonbankruptcy law in determining the rate when conducting present-value analysis for the 
RECONCEPTUALIZING PRESENT-VALUE ANALYSIS 	 117 
commentators, who have failed to follow existing signposts throughout the 
Code that ultimately reveal the appropriate discount rate. As a result of this 
failure, a great deal of the debate over discounting in consumer bankruptcy 
cases has been inappropriately couched in terms of adequately 
compensating creditors for the opportunity cost and the default risk that 
arise from deferred repayment by a debtor. Because these considerations 
overlook, and sometimes even contravene, relevant Code provisions, the 
discount-rate calculus has been analytically unsound. Moreover, no 
comprehensive effort has been made to determine whether, and if so the 
extent to which, the Code’s approach to present-value analysis squares with 
the normative principles underlying bankruptcy law. 
Beyond these matters of legal consequence, however, present-value 
analysis is ultimately about money, plain and simple. In his critique of Till, 
Robert Rasmussen has observed that the competing discount rates offered 
by the debtor and the creditor translated into a mere $807.44 difference 
over a three-year period, an amount "seemingly not much over which to 
make a federal case."13  But if one recognizes that this type of controversy 
is highly repetitious, then, Rasmussen observes, the significant economic 
consequence of such litigation quickly becomes apparent: 
What mattered, of course, was not the money at stake in [Till], but rather 
what legal rule would govern future cases of this type. The lender is a 
repeat player in bankruptcy, and how courts determine the applicable 
rate of interest in a Chapter 13 plan is an issue that matters a lot to it. In 
2004, there were approximately 450,000 Chapter 13 cases. To be sure, 
not every Chapter 13 debtor has a car, but it is probably a safe bet that at 
least half of them do. . . . [I]f we take half of the Chapter 13 cases and 
assume that the amount at stake in Till represented an average in these 
cases, that comes out to $180 million at stake for 2004 alone.14 
Rasmussen’s estimate clearly does not account for the amounts at 
stake in all consumer bankruptcy cases involving present-value analysis. 
Individual debtors use Chapter 13 not only to retain cars, but also to retain 
other types of property (both real and personal).15  If that property is subject 
payment of tax claims. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 704(a), 119 Stat. 23, 125 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 511(a) (2006)). 
13. Robert K. Rasmussen, Creating a Calamity, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 319, 323 (2007). 
14. Id. at 324. 
15. During the 2009 calendar year, the total amount of assets reported by individual 
debtors who filed for Chapter 13 relief exceeded $66.1 billion (with approximately $52.3 
billion constituting real property and $13.8 billion constituting personal property). ADMIN. 
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 REPORT OF STATISTICS REQUIRED BY THE BANKRUPTCY 
ABUSE PREVENTION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT OF 2005, at 28 tbl.1D (2009), 
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to a creditor’s lien, or if the property is owned free and clear but cannot be 
claimed by the debtor as exempt property, the Code’s provision for present-
value analysis will be triggered,16  thereby opening the door for a potential 
dispute over the appropriate discount rate. When the disputes that 
materialize are considered in conjunction with Rasmussen’s $180 million 
estimate, it seems reasonable to hypothesize that the amount at stake on an 
annual basis is at least a quarter of a billion dollars.17 
The main goal of this Article is to reconceptualize present-value 
analysis in consumer bankruptcy. It argues that, as a positive matter, the 
Bankruptcy Code compels the use of a discount rate that accounts solely for 
expected inflation, but that does not take into account opportunity cost or 
the risk of nonpayment. 
Part II.A describes the Code provisions that require a court to conduct 
present-value analysis as a condition to Chapter 13 plan confirmation. Part 
II.B discusses the Supreme Court’s decision in Till v. SCS Credit Corp. in 
which a fractured Court arguably failed to provide a binding rule for 
present-value analysis as applied to the payment of secured claims in 
Chapter 13. Part III critiques the plurality and dissenting opinions in Till— 
both of which advocated a risk-adjusted discount rate—for their failure to 
interpret the Code properly. Part III also builds on Justice Thomas’s 
concurring opinion, which advocated a risk-free discount rate, to 
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BAPCPA/ 
2009/Table1D.pdf. It is the case, of course, that some debtors will choose not to retain their 
assets in their Chapter 13 cases. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(C) (2006) (providing that a 
debtor may satisfy the claim of a creditor that is secured by property by surrendering the 
property to the creditor). But even if only a quarter of the amounts from 2009 represented 
the property sought to be retained by Chapter 13 debtors, the amounts involved are still quite 
substantial. 
16. See infra Part III.A (discussing when the Chapter 13 provisions for present-value 
analysis apply). 
17. In support of this conservative estimate, consider that total disbursements during 
the 2009 fiscal year by Chapter 13 trustees to secured creditors that were owed nonmortgage 
debt exceeded $1.3 billion. See U.S. Trustee Program, Chapter 13 Handbooks & Reference 
Materials, http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/private_trustee/library/chapter13/index.htm (last 
visited Feb. 16, 2011) (providing Chapter 13 statistics by fiscal year) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). Present-value analysis is usually not implicated in the 
context of mortgage debt because the Bankruptcy Code generally prohibits a debtor from 
modifying the rights of a creditor whose claim is secured only by a security interest in real 
property that is the debtor’s principal residence. 11 U.S.C. § 1332(b)(2). There are 
exceptions, however, such as when the mortgage is not on the debtor’s principal residence 
(in which case the Code’s anti-modification provision does not apply in the first instance). 
Another exception is when the mortgage is on the debtor’s principal residence, but the last 
payment on the mortgage is contractually due prior to the final payment scheduled in the 
debtor’s Chapter 13 plan. Id. § 1322(c)(2). 
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demonstrate the propriety of using an inflation rate for discounting 
payments in consumer bankruptcy. Part IV describes the limited 
circumstances pursuant to which the Code allows the recovery of interest 
(i.e., amounts relating to opportunity cost, expected inflation, and risk of 
nonpayment) that matures subsequent to a debtor’s bankruptcy filing. This 
descriptive account further bolsters the Article’s positive theory of present-
value analysis in consumer bankruptcy. Finally, Part V sets forth the 
normative arguments that justify the Article’s positive theory of present-
value analysis. 
II. The Problem and the Court’s Solution 
An individual who files for bankruptcy generally faces the decision of 
filing under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 of the Code.18  One of the most 
significant functional differences between the two chapters relates to the 
manner in which creditor claims are paid. Claim repayment in Chapter 7 
involves the distribution of proceeds from the sale of the debtor’s pre-
bankruptcy, nonexempt assets.19  On the other hand, claim repayment in 
Chapter 13 involves the distribution of the debtor’s post-bankruptcy 
income.20  Because claim repayment in Chapter 13 constitutes a deferred 
18. A debtor may voluntarily commence a bankruptcy case by filing with the 
bankruptcy court a petition under the particular operative chapter of the Bankruptcy Code 
pursuant to which he or she seeks relief. 11 U.S.C. § 301(a). Individual debtors may file for 
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 109(b), (d); Toibb v. Radloff, 501 
U.S. 157, 160–61, 166 (1991). However, Chapter 11 filings by individual debtors constitute 
a small percentage of total consumer filings. See, e.g., JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF 
THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS: 2009 ANNUAL 
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR app. at 291 tbl.F-2 (2010), available at http://www. 
uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/JudicialBusiness.aspx?doc=/uscourts/Statistics/Judic 
ialBusiness/2009/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf (indicating that there were 1,306 
nonbusiness Chapter 11 filings of a total 1,344,095 nonbusiness filings during the twelve-
month period ending September 30, 2009). Individuals who are family farmers with regular 
income are eligible to file for relief under Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 109(f). Chapter 12 filings likewise constitute a very small percentage of bankruptcy 
filings by individuals. See, e.g., DUFF, supra, app. at 291 tbl.F-2 (indicating that there were 
487 Chapter 12 filings during the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2009). 
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (providing that commencement of a case creates an 
estate consisting of "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the case"); id. § 704(a)(1) (requiring the trustee to "collect and reduce to 
money the property of the estate"); id. § 726(a) (providing for distribution of property of the 
estate); id. § 522(b) (allowing debtor to claim as exempt certain property from property of 
the estate). 
20. See id. § 1322(a)(1) (requiring that the plan "provide for the submission of all or 
such portion of future earnings or other future income of the debtor to the supervision and 
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stream of future payments, the Code requires that, as a condition to 
confirmation of the debtor’s repayment plan, the payments to the creditor 
be discounted to their present value.21  Unfortunately, the Code does not 
expressly set forth how to calculate the appropriate discount rate to confirm 
that creditors in Chapter 13 will be properly compensated. 
From the time that Congress enacted the Code in 1978,22  courts 
developed different approaches to address this issue.23  The diverging 
results across and within circuits eventually led the Supreme Court in 2004, 
in Till v. SCS Credit Corp., to consider the issue as applied to the 
repayment of secured claims in Chapter 13.24  Although the plurality and 
the dissent disagreed on the methodology for calculating the discount rate, 
they ultimately agreed that the rate must incorporate a premium for risk.25  
In stark contrast, Justice Thomas, who concurred in the judgment to reverse 
and remand the case to the bankruptcy court, disagreed with the consensus 
underlying the plurality and dissenting opinions.26  In his view, the Code’s 
discount-rate calculus does not call for any risk adjustment.27 
control of the trustee as is necessary for the execution of the plan"). A Chapter 7 debtor’s 
post-bankruptcy income is excluded from the debtor’s estate. Id. § 541(a)(6). Thus, such 
income is not available as a source of property for the repayment of creditor claims in 
Chapter 7. Id. § 726(a). In contrast, a Chapter 13 debtor’s post-bankruptcy income is 
included in the debtor’s estate. Id. § 1306(a)(2). The Code permits a Chapter 13 debtor to 
retain all property of the estate not used to repay creditor claims. Id. §§ 1306(b), 1327(b). 
That said, the Code does authorize a debtor to use pre-bankruptcy assets, in addition to post-
bankruptcy income, to repay creditor claims. Id. § 1322(a)(8). The functional difference in 
claim repayment under the two chapters has been described as "the basic chapter 13 
bargain." David Gray Carlson, Modified Plans of Reorganization and the Basic Chapter 13 
Bargain, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 585, 585–86 (2009). 
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (setting forth requirement for discounting property 
distributed on account of allowed nonpriority unsecured claims); id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) 
(setting forth requirement for discounting property distributed on account of allowed secured 
claims). But see id. § 1322(a)(2) (omitting any requirement that deferred cash payments to 
priority unsecured claims be discounted to present value). 
22. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as 
amended primarily at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 (2006)). 
23. See 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 259 ("The absence of a 
statutory authority has led courts to employ different methods to determine the appropriate 
rate of interest."); David G. Epstein, Don’t Go and Do Something Rash About Cram Down 
Interest Rates, 49 ALA. L. REV. 435, 443–59 (1998) (summarizing the various approaches to 
present-value analysis adopted by courts of appeals prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997)). 
24. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
25. Id. at 491–92, 508 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
26. Id. at 486 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
27. Id. 
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Part II.A sets forth a brief overview of the general principles governing 
present-value analysis of claim repayment in Chapter 13. Against this 
backdrop, Part II.B discusses the Court’s decision in Till. 
A. Present-Value Analysis in Chapter 13 
A debtor’s Chapter 13 plan must satisfy various standards in order to 
be confirmed.28  Among those standards are two key provisions regarding 
the amount of property, usually income,29  that a debtor must distribute to 
allowed claims, both secured and unsecured. The confirmation standard 
for payment of allowed unsecured claims, commonly referred to as the 
"best interest of creditors test,"30  will be satisfied if "the value, as of the 
effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on 
account of each allowed unsecured claim is not less than the amount that 
would be paid on such claim if the estate of the debtor were liquidated 
under chapter 7 of [the Bankruptcy Code] on such date."31  In those 
instances where the debtor proposes to retain the property securing a 
holder’s claim and where the holder of the allowed secured claim has not 
accepted the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan,32  a process commonly referred to 
28. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (2006). The Supreme Court’s recent decision in United 
Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa indicates that the confirmation standards for a Chapter 
13 plan are mandatory and that bankruptcy courts have an independent obligation to ensure 
compliance with those standards. See United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 
1367, 1381 (2010) (stating that "§ 1325(a) instructs a bankruptcy court to confirm a plan 
only if the court finds, inter alia, that the plan complies with the ‘applicable provisions’ of 
the Code"); id. at 1381 n.14 (stating that Code § 1325(a) "requires bankruptcy courts to 
address and correct a defect in a debtor’s proposed plan even if no creditor raises the issue"); 
Shaw v. Aurgroup Fin. Credit Union, 552 F.3d 447, 462 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that 
confirmation standards for a Chapter 13 plan are mandatory); Wachovia Dealer Servs. v. 
Jones (In re Jones), 530 F.3d 1284, 1290 (10th Cir. 2008) (same); Barnes v. Barnes (In re 
Barnes), 32 F.3d 405, 407 (9th Cir. 1994) (concluding that Code § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) is a 
mandatory requirement for plan confirmation). But see In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 1405, 1412 
(3d Cir. 1989) (concluding that Code § 1325(a) is a nonmandatory provision that "leaves an 
area of discretion for the court to confirm a plan which comports with the mandatory 
provisions of § 1322, but does not meet the conditions of § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)–(iii)"). 
Additional standards must be satisfied if the trustee or the holder of an allowed unsecured 
claim objects to plan confirmation. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1). 
29. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (discussing differences in claim 
repayment in Chapters 7 and 13). 
30. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 430 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6385. 
31. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4). 
32. If the holder of an allowed secured claim has accepted the plan, the confirmation 
standard for the payment of the allowed secured claim will be satisfied. 11 U.S.C. 
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as "cramdown,"33  the confirmation standard for payment of allowed 
secured claims will be satisfied if, among other things, "the value, as of the 
effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under the plan on 
account of [each allowed secured] claim is not less than the allowed amount 
of such claim."34 
The language of the two confirmation standards is quite similar and 
worth noting. Consider a side-by-side comparison of the two statutory 
provisions, broken down into their constituent parts, as set forth in Table 1. 
Table 1: Chapter 13 Confirmation Standards for Claim Repayment 
Code § 1325(a)(4): 
Allowed Unsecured Claims 
Code § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii): 
Allowed Secured Claims 
(A1) 	the 	value, 	as 	of 	the (B1) the value, as of the effective 
effective date of the plan, of property date of the plan, of property to be 
to be distributed under the plan on distributed under the plan on account 
account of each allowed unsecured 
claim 
is not less than 
of [each allowed secured] claim 
is not less than 
(B2) the allowed amount of such 
(A2) the amount that would be 
paid on such claim if the estate of the 
debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 
of [the Bankruptcy Code] on such date 
claim 
Both provisions establish inequalities that, if not satisfied, will 
preclude plan confirmation.35  In the case of payment of an allowed 
unsecured claim, the Code requires a comparison of (1) the discounted 
present value of property to be distributed to the holder of the claim (i.e., 
the amount denominated A1 in Table 1)36  to (2) the payment the holder 
§ 1325(a)(5)(A). Alternatively, if the debtor surrenders the property securing an allowed 
secured claim, the confirmation standard will likewise be satisfied. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(C). 
33. See Epstein, supra note 23, at 436–38 (discussing cramdown process). For the 
origins of the phrase "cramdown," see William Safire, On Language: Cramdown, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 25, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 12. 
34. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). 
35. See supra note 28 and accompanying text (discussing mandatory nature of Chapter 
13 plan confirmation requirements). 
36. The amount denominated A1 in Table 1 requires a court (a) to ascertain the 
nominal amount of property that will be distributed to the holder of the allowed unsecured 
claim under the plan and (b) to then calculate the value of such property as of the effective 
date of the plan. It is the latter step that entails discounting the stream of income payments 
that will be received by the claim holder over a period that could possibly extend up to five 
years. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(d) (setting forth limits on the duration of a Chapter 13 plan). 
Specifically, the future stream of income payments (and/or other property distributed) will 
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would receive in an immediate Chapter 7 liquidation of the debtor’s estate 
(i.e., the amount denominated A2 in Table 1).37  The plan can be confirmed 
only if the former equals or exceeds the latter (i.e., A1 > A2). In the case of 
cramdown payment of an allowed secured claim, the Code requires a 
comparison of (1) the discounted present value of property to be distributed 
to the holder of the claim (i.e., the amount denominated B1 in Table 1) to 
(2) the allowed amount of the secured claim (i.e., the amount denominated 
B2 in Table 1), an amount that entails a valuation of the property securing 
the claim.38  Again, the plan can be confirmed only if the former equals or 
exceeds the latter (i.e., B1 > B2). 
There are critical points regarding the basic framework for claim 
repayment in Chapter 13 that should not be overlooked. First, the 
be discounted back to the effective date of the plan. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 414 
(1977) (noting that valuation as of the effective date of the plan "contemplates a present 
value analysis that will discount value to be received in the future"), reprinted in 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6370. The Bankruptcy Code does not define the term "effective date of 
the plan." See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (failing to include "effective date of the plan" among the 
definitions applicable throughout the Bankruptcy Code). A debtor may set forth a provision 
in his or her Chapter 13 plan that specifies a particular date as the "effective date" of the 
plan. E.g., In re Gibson, 415 B.R. 735, 738 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009); In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 
872 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984). For further discussion regarding the effective date of a plan, see 
Carlson, supra note 20, at 601. 
37. The statutory language relating to the amount denominated A2 in Table 1 refers to 
a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation on the effective date of the Chapter 13 plan—in other 
words, an immediate Chapter 7 liquidation that does not involve delay. It has been argued, 
however, that the amount distributed in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation should be 
discounted to present value in order to reflect the reality that liquidation of a debtor’s estate 
is a process that takes time. See 1 HENRY J. SOMMER ET AL., CONSUMER BANKRUPTCY LAW 
AND PRACTICE § 12.3.2, at 292 n.62 (John Rao ed., 8th ed. 2006) (stating that, in conducting 
the "best interests of creditors test" under Code § 1325(a)(4), "the court should also take into 
account the delay which occurs before creditors receive dividends in a chapter 7 case"); cf. 
Kenneth N. Klee, Adjusting Chapter 11: Fine Tuning the Plan Process, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
551, 567–68 (1995) (arguing that the "best interests of creditors test" under Code 
§ 1129(a)(7) should be amended "so that it looks at present-value dollars that would be 
distributed from the estate in a hypothetical Chapter 7 case where conversion commences on 
the effective date of the plan and not at a distribution that assumes an instantaneous 
liquidation"). In some instances, the process can take years. See In re Smith, 431 B.R. 607, 
611 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2010) (noting that, in one Chapter 7 case, "distribution to unsecured 
creditors did not occur for over two years after the petition date" and that "[t]his amount of 
time is not unusual for administration of an average chapter 7 estate"). 
38. See infra note 269 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which the 
Bankruptcy Code defines the secured status of an allowed claim); see also Epstein, supra 
note 23, at 438 (noting that cramdown first requires a court to "determine the value of the 
creditor’s collateral" and subsequently to "determine the value of the deferred payments 
proposed by the plan to determine whether the present value of such payments at least equals 
the value of the collateral"). 
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confirmation threshold for claim repayment is keyed to substantive 
entitlements specified elsewhere in the Bankruptcy Code. The entitlements 
are represented by the amount denominated A2 (in the case of allowed 
unsecured claims) and the amount denominated B2 (in the case of allowed 
secured claims). Second, once the threshold has been established, the 
question becomes whether the property that the debtor plans to distribute 
over the life of the plan has a discounted present value that, at a minimum, 
equals the threshold. In other words, the discounting process seeks to 
verify that, notwithstanding the delay in payment, the claim holder is 
scheduled to receive the equivalent of its present-day substantive 
entitlement.39  As a matter of statutory design, that process is articulated in 
a content-neutral manner. A comparison of the discounting process for 
unsecured claims (denominated A1 in Table 1) and for secured claims 
(denominated B1 in Table 1) reveals nearly identical language such that the 
discounting process should be the same for both classes of claims.40  With 
39. See Rake v. Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 472 n.8 (1993) ("[A] creditor receives the 
‘present value’ of its claim only if the total amount of the deferred payments includes the 
amount of the underlying claim plus an appropriate amount of interest to compensate the 
creditor for the decreased value of the claim caused by the delayed payments."); H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-595, at 413 (1977) (noting that "property is to be valued as of the effective date of 
the plan, thus recognizing the time-value of money"), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 
6369; Dean Pawlowic, Entitlement to Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 12 BANKR. DEV. 
J. 149, 173 (1995) (noting that "the entitlement to receive plan interest is merely a means to 
provide for present value"). 
40. See, e.g., Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality 
opinion) ("We think it likely that Congress intended bankruptcy judges and trustees to 
follow essentially the same approach when choosing an appropriate interest rate under any 
of these provisions."); In re Cook, 322 B.R. 336, 345 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (considering 
the language of Code §§ 1325(a)(4) and 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) and concluding "that Congress 
would intend identical language to have identical meaning when it is used twice in the same 
section of the Code"); In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842, 845 n.2 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) 
("[A]lmost all courts which have examined the concept of present value in Chapters 11, 12, 
and 13 treat present value as a universal concept throughout the Code. . . . This Court’s 
analysis will proceed accordingly."), abrogated by Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. 
Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997); Pawlowic, supra note 39, at 169 
("For purposes of present value analysis, bankruptcy cases have not been distinguished on 
the basis of the chapters under which they were filed, and the concept of present value has 
been construed to have a single meaning wherever it is used in the Code."); cf. Dewsnup v. 
Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 422 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("We have often invoked the normal 
rule of statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are 
intended to have the same meaning. That rule must surely apply, a fortiori, to the use of 
identical words in the same section of the same enactment." (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted)). For an extended discussion on the applicability of case law and concepts 
from Chapter 13 cases when similar issues arise in Chapter 11 cases, and vice versa, see 
generally David G. Epstein & Christopher Fuller, Chapters 11 and 13 of the Bankruptcy 
Code—Observations on Using Case Authority from One of the Chapters in Proceedings 
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these considerations in mind, the discussion now turns to the Court’s 
interpretation of present-value analysis as applied to cramdown payments in 
Chapter 13. 
B. Till v. SCS Credit Corp. 
Till involved a dispute between the Tills, a married couple who jointly 
filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Code, and SCS Credit 
Corporation (SCS), the creditor to whom the Tills were indebted on account 
of a retail installment contract for a used truck that was subject to SCS’s 
purchase-money security interest.41  The Tills sought to retain the used 
truck and, in so doing, proposed to make cramdown payments to SCS,42 
whose $4,894.89 claim was undersecured due to the $4,000 value of the 
truck securing the claim.43  Consequently, SCS’s claim was bifurcated into 
an allowed secured claim of $4,000 and an allowed unsecured claim of 
44 $894.89. The Chapter 13 plan provided that the Tills would pay interest 
on SCS’s allowed secured claim at the rate of 9.5%, one-and-a-half 
percentage points above the national prime rate.45  SCS objected to the plan, 
arguing that the Tills would have to pay interest at the rate of 21% in order 
to compensate SCS adequately.46  The interest rate suggested by SCS 
happened to be the interest rate set forth in the contract between the Tills 
and SCS.47  Thus, the task for the Court was to ascertain whether the Tills’ 
proposed cramdown payments adequately compensated SCS.48  The 
remainder of this Section will begin by considering how the plurality and 
Under the Other, 38 VAND. L. REV. 901 (1985). In that discussion, Epstein and Fuller offer 
arguments for why a valid approach to present-value analysis in Chapter 13 may be equally 
applicable in Chapter 11. Id. at 905–10; see also Epstein, supra note 23, at 469 ("The 
present Congressional language, ‘value, as of the effect[ive] date of the plan,’ does not 
support a fixed cram down interest rate or support handling Chapter 13 cram down interest 
rate proceedings different from Chapter 11 cram down interest rate proceedings."). 
41. Till, 541 U.S. at 469–70 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
42. Id. at 471. 
43. Id. at 470. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 471. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 470. 
48. See id. at 474 (stating that Chapter 13 cramdown provision ensures that "property 
to be distributed to a particular secured creditor over the life of a bankruptcy plan has a total 
‘value, as of the effective date of the plan,’ that equals or exceeds the value of the creditor’s 
allowed secured claim—in this case, $4,000"). 
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dissenting opinions conceived of the underlying substance of the 
discounting process and will then contrast those opinions to Justice 
Thomas’s concurring opinion. 
1. The Plurality and Dissenting Opinions 
Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion begins by framing present-value 
analysis as the function of an interest rate that consists of the three 
components traditionally included in an interest rate—opportunity cost, a 
premium for expected inflation, and a premium for the risk of default:49 
A debtor’s promise of future payments is worth less than an immediate 
payment of the same total amount because the creditor cannot use the 
money right away, inflation may cause the value of the dollar to decline 
before the debtor pays, and there is always some risk of nonpayment. 
The challenge for bankruptcy courts reviewing such repayment schemes, 
therefore, is to choose an interest rate sufficient to compensate the 
creditor for these concerns.50 
Further entrenching the concept of present-value analysis as a function 
of garden-variety interest-rate payments, Justice Stevens repeatedly invoked 
a loan metaphor—specifically, that the creditor to whom the debtor makes 
cramdown payments essentially makes a forced loan, or "cramdown loan," 
to the debtor.51  This metaphor unfortunately obfuscates matters insofar as 
cramdown, a statutory directive involving a pre-existing secured-credit 
relationship in which the debtor had likely already defaulted, is far removed 
49. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 194 (7th ed. 2007) 
(identifying the "three main components" of an interest rate as the opportunity cost, the risk 
premium, and the anticipated inflation rate); Pawlowic, supra note 39, at 173–74 ("This 
compensation includes three components: (1) the real rate . . . (2) an expected inflation 
rate . . . and (3) a risk premium . . . ."); cf. Edward R. Morrison, Timbers of Inwood Forest, 
the Economics of Rent, and the Evolving Dynamics of Chapter 11, in BANKRUPTCY LAW 
STORIES 21, 29 (Robert K. Rasmussen ed., 2007) (noting that rate of return "compensates 
investor for the time value of money . . . and risk"); Alan Schwartz, Valuation of Collateral, 
in BANKRUPTCY LAW STORIES, supra, at 103, 108 ("Two elements constitute an interest 
rate[:] the rate must compensate the lender for the time value of money, and the rate must 
compensate the lender for bearing the risk of nonpayment."). 
50. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 474 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) 
(emphasis added); see also id. at 477 (stating that a "court should aim . . . to ensure that an 
objective economic analysis would suggest the debtor’s interest payments will adequately 
compensate all such creditors for the time value of their money and the risk of default"). 
51. See id. at 475 n.12, 476 & n.14, 477 (using repeatedly the term "cramdown loan"). 
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from the concept of a market-based transaction involving a new extension 
of credit by a creditor to a debtor.52 
With the loan metaphor as a backdrop, Justice Stevens set forth a 
present-value analysis that presumptively establishes the national prime rate 
as the appropriate discount rate.53  For the plurality, one of the hallmarks of 
the prime rate that makes it an appropriate discount rate is that it 
"compensate[s] for the opportunity costs of the loan, the risk of inflation, 
and the relatively slight risk of default."54  The plurality, however, allowed 
for the possibility of an upward adjustment of the prime rate in order to 
account for the risk of nonpayment by a debtor in bankruptcy (as opposed 
to a solvent and creditworthy commercial borrower).55  While the plurality 
52. One need look no further than Code § 364, which governs the obtaining of post-
petition credit and incurring of debt by a debtor’s estate to confirm that the distribution 
provided to a creditor on account of its pre-petition claim is conceptually distinct from the 
post-petition extension of credit to a debtor’s estate, which gives rise to a post-petition claim 
against the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2006); Shapiro v. Saybrook Mfg. Co. (In re Saybrook 
Mfg. Co.), 963 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1992); cf. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dobbins, 35 
F.3d 860, 867 n.7 (4th Cir. 1994) (observing in the context of the allowance of 
administrative expense claims how post-petition use of collateral by a debtor without 
creditor consent does not actually entail an extension of credit to the debtor’s estate). The 
Till plurality, however, failed to appreciate this distinction. Instead, it improperly conflated 
the concepts of Chapter 11 cramdown under Code § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) and post-petition 
financing for Chapter 11 debtors under Code § 364. See Till, 541 U.S. at 476 n.14 (Stevens, 
J., plurality opinion) (discussing the manner in which the market for debtor-in-possession 
financing might inform the cramdown rate in a Chapter 11 case). 
Moreover, use of the loan metaphor seems inconsistent in light of Justice Stevens’s 
rejection of the "coerced loan approach" to present-value analysis. Id. at 477. The 
descriptive account of that approach turns on the concept of a creditor required to lend 
against its will to the debtor post-bankruptcy. In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842, 845 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tex. 1994), abrogated by Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 
121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997). One would think that rejection of the approach would 
reasonably entail distancing oneself from the rationale’s rhetoric. In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 
596–97 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Till v. SCS 
Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 
105 F.3d 55, 63–64 (2d Cir. 1997), abrogated by Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 
U.S. 953 (1997). Justice Stevens obviously conceptualized the cramdown loan as something 
different than what the coerced loan approach requires. Till, 541 U.S. at 476 (Stevens, J., 
plurality opinion). But, by relying on the loan metaphor, the plurality improperly framed the 
issue, which in turn resulted in imprecise analysis. See infra Part III.B (arguing that the 
plurality and dissenting opinions in Till failed to interpret the Code properly). 
53. Till, 541 U.S. at 478–79 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); see also id. at 484 
(referring to prime rate as a "presumptive rate" that can be rebutted). 
54. Id. at 479. 
55. See id. ("Because bankrupt debtors typically pose a greater risk of nonpayment 
than solvent commercial borrowers, the approach then requires a bankruptcy court to adjust 
the prime rate accordingly."). 
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did not set forth a scale that would be appropriate for risk adjustment,56  it 
specified that "the circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, 
and the duration and feasibility of the reorganization plan" would be 
appropriate factors to consider in making an upward risk adjustment.57 
Finally, pursuant to the plurality’s "formula" or "prime-plus" approach for 
calculating the discount rate,58  the burden of proof falls on the creditor, 
whom the plurality viewed as the better informed party, to justify the risk 
adjustment.59 
Like the plurality, the dissent in Till interpreted the Code as requiring 
that the discount rate used in present-value analysis incorporate a risk 
premium for nonpayment by the debtor.60  Justice Scalia’s dissenting 
opinion argues, however, for a present-value analysis that presumptively 
establishes the contract interest rate as the appropriate discount rate,61  with 
the possibility that either upward or downward adjustments of the rate 
could be sought by either the debtor or the creditor.62  From the dissent’s 
perspective, the initial estimate provided by the contract rate is likely to be 
more accurate than the prime rate, thereby resulting in less litigation and its 
concomitant costs.63  Finally, like the plurality, Justice Scalia identified 
56. Id. at 480. 
57. Id. at 479. 
58. Id. at 480. 
59. See id. at 479 ("[S]tarting from a concededly low estimate and adjusting upward 
places the evidentiary burden squarely on the creditors, who are likely to have readier access 
to any information from the debtor’s filing . . . ."); id. at 484–85 ("[T]he formula approach, 
which begins with a concededly low estimate of the appropriate interest rate and requires the 
creditor to present evidence supporting a higher rate, places the evidentiary burden on the 
more knowledgeable party, thereby facilitating more accurate calculation of the appropriate 
interest rate."). 
60. See id. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the plurality and dissent "agree 
that any deferred payments to a secured creditor must fully compensate it for the risk that 
[Chapter 13 plan] failure will occur"); id. at 508 ("Eight Justices are in agreement that the 
rate of interest set forth in the debtor’s approved plan must include a premium for risk."). 
61. See id. at 494 (stating that "the contract rate is a decent estimate, or at least the 
lower bound, for the appropriate rate in cramdown"). 
62. See id. at 494 n.2 ("The contract rate is only a presumption, however, and either 
party remains free to prove that a higher or lower rate is appropriate in a particular case."). 
63. See id. at 500 ("[I]t is far more important that the initial estimate be accurate than 
that the burden of proving inaccuracy fall on the better informed party."). Perhaps not 
surprisingly, the plurality argued that the formula approach yields the more accurate risk 
estimate and minimizes litigation costs. See id. at 484–85 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) 
(arguing that the formula approach "places the evidentiary burden on the more 
knowledgeable party, thereby facilitating more accurate calculation of the appropriate 
interest rate"); id. at 479 ("[T]he formula approach entails a straightforward, familiar, and 
objective inquiry, and minimizes the need for potentially costly additional evidentiary 
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those factors that should inform a risk premium adjustment, noting that "the 
most relevant factors bearing on risk premium are (1) the probability of 
plan failure; (2) the rate of collateral depreciation; (3) the liquidity of the 
collateral market; and (4) the administrative expenses of enforcement."64 
He further noted that the contract rate had the advantage of already having 
incorporated such factors.65 
Based on the foregoing discussion, one sees that the plurality and 
dissenting opinions in Till disagreed over the manner in which risk 
assessment should be incorporated into present-value analysis, rather than 
whether such analysis should adjust for risk in the first instance.66  It is this 
latter point, however, on which Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion is 
diametrically opposed to both the plurality and the dissent. 
2. Justice Thomas’s Concurring Opinion 
Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion, which embraces a plain-meaning 
approach to interpreting the Chapter 13 cramdown provision,67  begins by 
shifting present-value analysis away from the loan metaphor, which in turn 
facilitates reconceptualizing the discount rate as a rate that should not 
account for risk of default: 
Both the plurality and the dissent ignore the clear text of the statute 
[Code § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)] in an apparent rush to ensure that secured 
creditors are not undercompensated in bankruptcy proceedings. But the 
statute that Congress enacted does not require a debtor-specific risk 
adjustment that would put secured creditors in the same position as if 
they had made another loan.68 
proceedings."). 
64. Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also id. at 484 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) 
(discussing risk-premium factors identified by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion). 
65. Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
66. See id. at 485 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he plurality and dissent agree that the 
proper method for discounting deferred payments to present value should take into account 
each of these factors, but disagree over the proper starting point for calculating the risk of 
nonpayment."); id. at 491 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("My areas of agreement with the plurality 
are substantial. . . . Our only disagreement is over what procedure will more often produce 
accurate estimates of the appropriate interest rate."). 
67. See id. at 486, 489 (Thomas, J., concurring) (making references to "the clear text 
of the statute" and "the plain language of the statute"). 
68. Id. at 486. 
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With this frame, Justice Thomas proceeded to explain why the Code 
compels the use of a risk-free discount rate for present-value analysis. 
The linchpin for Justice Thomas’s argument is that the language of the 
Chapter 13 cramdown provision focuses solely on the value of the property 
the debtor proposes to distribute to a claim holder rather than the value of a 
promise to distribute property.69  In other words, when the Code uses the 
language "property to be distributed under the plan,"70  Justice Thomas 
would read the Code as instructing the court (1) to identify the property that 
the debtor proposes to distribute to the claim holder over the life of the 
Chapter 13 plan,71  and then (2) to conduct a present-value analysis of that 
property with the assumption that such property will in fact be distributed.72 
On this reading, one assumes away risk of default when ascertaining the 
appropriate discount rate, thereby yielding a risk-free rate.73  Further 
justifying the use of a risk-free rate, Justice Thomas pointed to other 
Chapter 13 confirmation standards that serve a protective function for 
creditors—namely, the requirements that (1) a Chapter 13 plan must be 
proposed in good faith,74  (2) a creditor whose claim is crammed down must 
retain the lien securing the claim,75  and (3) a Chapter 13 plan must be 
financially feasible (including that the debtor must be able to make all 
payments under the plan)76—all of which mitigate risk of default.77 
69. See id. at 486 (stating that Chapter 13 cramdown provision "requires only that ‘the 
value . . . of property to be distributed under the plan,’ at the time of the effective date of the 
plan, be no less than the amount of the secured creditor’s claim" (omission in original) 
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii))); id. at 487 ("The statute only requires the valuation 
of the ‘property to be distributed,’ not the valuation of the plan (i.e., the promise to make the 
payments itself)."). 
70. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006). 
71. See Till, 541 U.S. at 486 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Second, a court must 
determine what is the ‘property to be distributed under the plan.’"). 
72. See id. ("Third, a court must determine the ‘value, as of the effective date of the 
plan,’ of the property to be distributed."); id. at 505 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that 
Justice Thomas "reads the statutory phrase ‘property to be distributed under the plan’ to 
mean the proposed payments if made as the plan contemplates" (citations omitted)); see also 
Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 329–30 ("Justice Thomas, in essence, assumes that all 
promised payments will be made."). 
73. See Till, 541 U.S. at 488 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[A]lthough there is always 
some risk of nonpayment when A promises to repay a debt to B through a stream of 
payments over time rather than through an immediate lump sum payment, 
§ 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) does not take this risk into account."). 
74. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3). 
75. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I). 
76. Id. § 1325(a)(6). 
77. See Till, 541 U.S. at 490 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Given the presence of multiple 
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Having rejected risk adjustment as part of present-value analysis, two 
questions remain to be answered: first, whether the Thomas concurrence 
specifies what factors ought to be considered in calculating the discount 
rate; and second, whether a particular metric exists that accurately estimates 
the rate. In answer to the first question, Thomas focused on the time value 
of money as the sole factor that ought to inform the discount-rate calculus: 
The requirement that the ‘value’ of the property to be distributed be 
determined ‘as of the effective date of the plan’ incorporates the 
principle of the time value of money. To put it simply, $4,000 today is 
worth more than $4,000 to be received seventeen months from today 
because if received today, the $4,000 can be invested to start earning 
interest immediately.78 
If time value of money is a function of a risk-free interest rate, then 
Justice Thomas’s approach to present-value analysis would account only 
for (1) opportunity cost and (2) expected inflation.79  To best approximate 
this, Justice Thomas suggested that courts ought to rely on the prime rate as 
the appropriate discount rate in present-value analysis.80  Ultimately, Justice 
Thomas concurred in the judgment of the plurality on the ground that the 
interest rate proposed by the Tills exceeded the risk-free prime rate and thus 
adequately compensated SCS.81  
3. Till ’s Postmortem 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia pointed out that all circuits had 
either explicitly or implicitly rejected the concept of a "risk-free" discount 
rate, and he further noted that Justice Thomas had failed to cite any 
decisional law supporting his position.82  The Court’s failure to reach 
consensus troubled Justice Scalia, who concluded his dissenting opinion by 
creditor-specific protections, it is by no means irrational to assume that Congress opted not 
to provide further protection for creditors by requiring a debtor-specific risk adjustment 
under § 1325(a)(5)."). 
78. Id. at 486–87. 
79. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (noting that the three basic components 
of an interest rate are (1) opportunity cost, (2) a premium for expected inflation, and (3) a 
premium for risk of default). 
80. Till, 541 U.S. at 488 n.2 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
81. Id. at 491. 
82. Id. at 506 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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writing that "[t]oday’s judgment is unlikely to burnish the Court’s 
reputation for reasoned decisionmaking."83 
Commentators have been equally critical of the Court’s failure to 
provide a definitive answer.84  Robert Rasmussen places the blame 
predominantly on Justice Thomas, whom he accuses of having been the 
most "tone-deaf to the situation."85  And even though Rasmussen lodges the 
same accusation at Justice Stevens,86  Rasmussen partially absolves him, 
observing that "[o]ne can . . . offer an intelligible defense of the result that 
Justice Stevens reaches."87  The implication of that statement is quite clear: 
Rasmussen believes that no intelligible defense exists for the Thomas 
concurrence. This belief, in turn, leads Rasmussen to conclude that Justice 
Thomas failed as a judge: Rather than compromise and cast his vote in a 
way that would produce a majority opinion, thereby restoring some 
functionality to the bankruptcy system, Justice Thomas heedlessly ventured 
out on his own and left the doctrine of present-value analysis in a state of 
disorder.88 
The remainder of this Article takes a contrary view. It argues that, as a 
descriptive matter, present-value analysis in consumer bankruptcy cases 
requires use of a discount rate that accounts only for expected inflation, but 
not default risk (as argued by Justice Thomas) or opportunity cost;89  and 
that, moreover, such a rate is desirable from both a normative perspective 
and an institutional-design perspective. But for Justice Thomas standing 
his ground and voting his conviction, the Court would have issued a 
precedential decision at odds with the text of and doctrine interpreting the 
Bankruptcy Code. Admittedly, an unsettled state of the law is undesirable. 
Worse yet, however, would have been an erroneously settled rule of 
decision that would have bound all lower courts and could only be 
83. Id. at 508. 
84. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 321–22 ("The Supreme Court’s 
fundamental task [in Till] was not so much to get it right as it was to get it done. On this 
score, it failed."); Schwartz, supra note 49, at 114 n.18 (noting that, in light of the lack of a 
majority for the plurality’s view in Till, the decision "has little practical value"). 
85. Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 331. 
86. See id. ("Justice Scalia, in his opinion, is not as tone-deaf to the situation as is 
either Justice Thomas, or, as we shall see, Justice Stevens."). 
87. Id. at 332. 
88. See id. at 328 ("Justice Thomas was content to issue an opinion that left the issue 
before the Court in an inconclusive draw."). 
89. Such a rate would be even less compensatory than the one advocated by Justice 
Thomas in Till. 
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remedied either by the Court subsequently reversing itself or through 
legislative override. 
III. Textual and Contextual Arguments for an Inflationary Discount Rate 
This Part challenges the long-standing notion that the discount rate in 
Chapter 13 cases must be adjusted for default risk and does so by 
examining closely other Code provisions relating to claim compensation as 
well as Supreme Court doctrine interpreting some of those provisions. It 
critiques the plurality and dissenting opinions in Till by marshalling the 
statutory arguments missing from Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion. 
These arguments not only bolster his conclusion, but also extend it. 
Part III.A focuses on the competing plain-meaning arguments offered 
by Justices Thomas and Scalia regarding the statutory phrase "property to 
be distributed under the plan"90  and demonstrates that such language cannot 
be interpreted to require a Chapter 13 debtor to compensate a creditor for 
default risk. Part III.B then argues that, when interpreting the phrase "as of 
the effective date of the plan,"91  context similarly justifies omitting a risk 
adjustment for default into the discount rate used in present-value analysis. 
It examines each of the factors identified by the plurality and the dissent as 
relevant to risk compensation and demonstrates why a contextual reading of 
the Bankruptcy Code compels the opposite conclusion—namely, that 
present-value analysis requires a risk-free discount rate.92 
Part III.C concludes by arguing that a contextual interpretation also 
compels a discount rate that does not take into account opportunity cost. 
Pursuant to this view, even Justice Thomas’s approach to present-value 
analysis overcompensates creditors. More precisely, the discount rate 
ought to compensate solely for expected inflation and nothing more. 
Accordingly, instead of using the prime rate to estimate the discount rate, 
which would systematically overcompensate creditors for purposes of 
present-value analysis, the Chapter 13 discount rate should be estimated 
using the interest rate on short-term Treasury notes with a downward 
adjustment that subtracts the real rate for the riskless cost of capital. 
90. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (2006). 
91. Id. 
92. Robert Rasmussen adamantly thinks otherwise. Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 
328–30. 
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A. "Property to Be Distributed" 
In order to understand why Justices Thomas and Scalia reached 
divergent conclusions regarding whether the discount rate must account for 
the risk of nonpayment, it is critical to focus on the statutory language of 
the cramdown provision, which both Justices interpreted pursuant to a 
plain-meaning approach.93  The language at issue is that which instructs a 
court to conduct present-value analysis—"the value, as of the effective date 
of the plan, of property to be distributed."94  Justice Thomas deconstructed 
this phrase into two main components: (1) "as of the effective date of the 
plan" and (2) "property to be distributed."95  Justice Thomas viewed the 
former phrase as encapsulating "the principle of the time value of money."96 
Accordingly, whether or not the Bankruptcy Code requires compensation 
for default risk depends on the meaning of the phrase "property to be 
distributed."97 
Justice Scalia accepted Justice Thomas’s analytical frame and, in 
doing so, acknowledged that their competing interpretations of the phrase 
"property to be distributed under the plan" would each be equally plausible 
when considered in isolation.98  Justice Scalia, however, argued that a 
contextual interpretation better supports his reading of the phrase,99  one that 
accounts for the risk of nonpayment.100 
93. See id. at 329–30 (observing that Justice Thomas "accuse[d] his brethren of textual 
infidelity" and that Justice Scalia "focuse[d] squarely on the text of the Bankruptcy Code"). 
94. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). 
95. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 487 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(discussing separately the meaning of the phrases "as of the effective date of the plan" and 
"property to be distributed"). 
96. Id. 
97. See id. at 487–88 (stating that "it is nonsensical to speak of a debtor’s risk of 
default being inherent in the value of ‘property’ unless that property is a promise or a debt"). 
Without deconstructing the relevant text, Justice Stevens argued "that § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii)’s 
reference to ‘value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed under 
the plan’ is better read to incorporate all of the commonly understood components of 
‘present value,’ including any risk of nonpayment." Id. at 483 (Stevens, J., plurality 
opinion). 
98. Id. at 505 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also conceded that Justice 
Thomas’s interpretation that the Code mandates a risk-free discount rate is plausible, but 
ultimately rejected the interpretation for precedential and practical concerns. Id. at 483 n.25 
(Stevens, J., plurality opinion). In other words, the plurality took the view that it was 
confronted with an egg that could not be unscrambled. 
99. Id. at 505 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
100. See id. ("I would instead read this phrase to mean the right to receive payments 
that the plan vests in the creditor upon confirmation. Because there is no guarantee that the 
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An amendment to the Bankruptcy Code in 2005 (subsequent to the Till 
decision), while not necessarily determinative, strongly suggests that the 
phrase "property to be distributed under the plan" cannot be interpreted to 
signify that the value of that property must be discounted to account for risk 
of default. Pursuant to that amendment, Congress added a requirement that 
individual debtors who file for Chapter 11 relief devote all of their 
disposable income (or its equivalent) to repaying creditor claims in the 
event that an unsecured creditor objects to plan confirmation and the plan 
does not propose to pay that creditor in full.101  The specific language of the 
requirement, set forth in Code § 1129(a)(15), provides that the court cannot 
confirm the debtor’s plan unless one of the following conditions is satisfied: 
(15) In a case in which the debtor is an individual and in which the 
holder of an allowed unsecured claim objects to confirmation of the 
plan— 
(A) the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of the property to be 
distributed under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the 
amount of such claim; or 
(B) the value of the property to be distributed under the plan is not less 
than the projected disposable income of the debtor (as defined in section 
1325(b)(2)) to be received during the 5-year period beginning on the 
date that the first payment is due under the plan, or during the period for 
which the plan provides payments, whichever is longer.102 
Because subparagraphs (A) and (B) are set forth in the alternative, a 
debtor’s Chapter 11 plan may be confirmed over the objection of an 
unsecured creditor so long as either subparagraph is satisfied.103  Notably, 
subparagraph (A) includes the phrase "as of the effective date of the plan," 
whereas subparagraph (B) does not.104  Recall that, pursuant to the 
promised payments will in fact be made, the value of this property right must account for the 
risk of nonpayment."). 
101. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
109-8, § 321(c)(1), 119 Stat. 23, 95 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15) (2006)). The 
amendment had the effect of bringing Chapter 11 plans filed by individual debtors more in 
line with Chapter 13 plans, which were subject to a disposable income requirement prior to 
the 2005 amendments. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1) (2000) (amended 2005); see also Bruce A. 
Markell, The Sub Rosa Subchapter: Individual Debtors in Chapter 11 After BAPCPA, 2007 
U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 77 ("‘Disposable income’ is a concept borrowed from chapter 13. 
Indeed, § 1129(a)(15) refers to § 1325(b)(2) for a definition of the concept." (footnote 
omitted)). 
102. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15) (2006). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. 
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analytical frame followed by Justices Thomas and Scalia, the phrase "as of 
the effective date of the plan" prompts discounting that accounts for the 
time value of money.105  On this account, subparagraph (A) requires that the 
unsecured creditor be compensated for opportunity cost and the risk of 
inflation, but subparagraph (B) does not.106 
If Justice Scalia is correct that "property to be distributed" must be 
interpreted to prompt discounting that accounts for risk of default, then 
subparagraph (B) requires that the debtor distribute to the objecting 
unsecured creditor a nominal amount of property that exceeds the projected 
disposable income of the debtor to be received during the longer of five 
years or the plan’s term.107  If the nominal amount of property is equal to or 
less than the relevant amount of projected disposable income, 
subparagraph (B) will not be satisfied by virtue of the fact that discounting 
the nominal amount of property for default risk will result in property with 
a present value that is less than the confirmation threshold.108 
When one considers that Congress intended individual debtors to fund 
their Chapter 11 plans predominantly (if not exclusively) with the income 
105. See supra notes 94–98 and accompanying text (deconstructing competing 
interpretations by Justices Thomas and Scalia of the phrase "value, as of the effective date of 
the plan, of property to be distributed"). 
106. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (indicating that the time value of money 
consists of opportunity cost and the anticipated inflation rate). 
107. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B). The Honorable Bruce Markell, U.S. Bankruptcy 
Judge for the District of Nevada, has interpreted Code § 1129(a)(15)(B)’s projected-
disposable-income confirmation threshold as "requir[ing] the debtor to devote an amount 
equal to five years’ worth of projected disposable income to the plan, with the five years 
measured from the date the plan is confirmed or plan payments start, whichever is later." 
Markell, supra note 101, at 87. That interpretation, however, cannot be squared with the 
provision’s language. Subparagraph (B) sets the confirmation threshold according to the 
projected disposable income that the debtor will receive during the longer of two time 
periods: either (1) "during the 5-year period beginning on the date that that the first payment 
is due under the plan" or (2) "during the period for which the plan provides payments." 11 
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(15)(B). The statutory language clearly contemplates that the latter time 
period (i.e., the plan’s term) could be less than, equal to, or greater than "the 5-year period 
beginning on the date that the first payment is due under the plan." Id. Thus, when the plan 
term exceeds five years, Code § 1129(a)(15)(B), by virtue of its phrase "whichever is 
longer," instructs a court to calculate the debtor’s projected disposable income during the 
plan’s term and to use that estimate as the confirmation threshold (i.e., the value of the 
property to be distributed under the plan must be greater than or equal to the projected-
disposable-income estimate). See, e.g., In re Washington, No. 09-3013-BJH-11, 2010 WL 
1417708, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Apr. 2, 2010). 
108. See infra note 144 and accompanying text (discussing the manner in which 
discounting reduces the present value of property to be distributed in the future). 
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they generate subsequent to filing for bankruptcy,109  it becomes apparent 
that interpreting the phrase "property to be distributed" to require 
discounting for default risk could frequently lead to an absurd result. It is 
reasonable to assume that most individual debtors who file for Chapter 11 
will not have sufficient pre-bankruptcy assets and post-bankruptcy income 
to fully repay their unsecured creditors. As such, if an unsecured creditor 
objects to plan confirmation, the debtor will be able to overcome the 
objection only by satisfying subparagraph (B). 	Assuming that 
subparagraph (B) requires discounting for default risk, then no debtor could 
ever satisfy subparagraph (B) with income alone. If a debtor’s plan solely 
proposed to distribute all of the debtor’s disposable income, the value of the 
income, once discounted, would be less than the nominal amount of 
disposable income generated by the debtor. Accordingly, the only way to 
satisfy subparagraph (B) would be for the debtor to liquidate pre-
bankruptcy assets to make up the difference. 
The Code certainly contemplates the possibility of the sale of assets by 
a Chapter 11 debtor.110  That said, it seems highly illogical that Congress 
would have devised a statutory scheme like the one just described. 
Consider the example of an individual debtor who has initially proposed to 
devote all of his projected disposable income to fund his Chapter 11 plan. 
Further suppose that the proposed payments will be solely devoted to fully 
repaying (as required by the Code): (1) objecting creditors with secured 
claims that have been subjected to cramdown,111  and (2) creditors whose 
unsecured claims are entitled to priority.112  Pursuant to this scenario, the 
debtor does not have surplus disposable income to make any payment to 
109. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(8) (providing that a plan shall, "in a case in which the 
debtor is an individual, provide for payment to creditors under the plan of all or such 
portions of earnings . . . or other future income of the debtor as is necessary for the execution 
of the plan"). 
110. See id. § 1123(a)(5) (providing that a Chapter 11 plan shall "provide adequate 
means for the plan’s implementation, such as . . . sale of all or any part of the property of the 
estate"); id. § 1123(b)(4) (providing that a Chapter 11 plan may "provide for the sale of all or 
substantially all of the property of the estate, and the distribution of the proceeds of such sale 
among holders of claims or interests"); see also Markell, supra note 101, at 77 (noting that, 
"if property from any other source—such as loans or gifts, or from exempt property—is used 
to supplement the payments to unsecured creditors, the [Chapter 11] plan may be shorter 
than five years"). For the argument theorizing that a Chapter 13 debtor cannot be forced to 
liquidate assets for the benefit of creditors, see Carlson, supra note 20, passim. 
111. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (requiring that a holder of a secured claim 
receive deferred cash payments whose present value is equal to the allowed secured claim). 
112. See id. § 1129(a)(9) (requiring that holders of priority unsecured claims be fully 
repaid in cash). 
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creditors with allowed nonpriority unsecured claims (i.e., general unsecured 
creditors). Nonetheless, one of those creditors objects to plan confirmation 
under Code § 1129(a)(15).113 
As things currently stand in this hypothetical, the creditor will prevail 
in its objection. Because the debtor’s plan does not propose to distribute 
any property to the creditor, the plan does not satisfy Code 
§ 1129(a)(15)(A), which requires the creditor’s claim to be fully repaid 
(taking into account present-value considerations).114  Moreover, even 
though the plan commits all of the debtor’s projected disposable income to 
repaying creditor claims, the plan does not satisfy Code 
§ 1129(a)(15)(B).115  As set forth above, if subparagraph (B) is interpreted 
to require discounting for default risk, then the value of the income, once 
discounted, will be less than the nominal amount of disposable income 
generated by the debtor. Thus, to overcome the creditor’s objection, the 
hypothetical debtor will have to modify the Chapter 11 plan to provide for 
the sale of a sufficient amount of estate property that will make up the 
difference between the nominal value and present value of the debtor’s 
disposable income.116  That difference will represent the premium for risk 
of default under the plan.117 
Simply put, this would be an absurd result. If the debtor were to 
modify his plan to overcome the creditor’s objection, the proceeds would 
not be distributed to the other creditors whose claims were proposed to be 
fully repaid. Instead, the proceeds would go to the class of creditors with 
allowed nonpriority unsecured claims. It seems ludicrous that, in a scenario 
such as this, Congress would have intended such creditors to receive risk-
default premiums when the debtor’s plan did not originally propose to make 
any payments to them (i.e., a situation in which default risk would be 
irrelevant to the creditor class). One might counter that Congress’s intent in 
enacting Code § 1129(a)(15)(B) was to provide a mechanism ensuring 
some distribution to general unsecured creditors, but the language of 
subparagraph (B) does not support that argument. Whereas the Chapter 13 
disposable-income requirement is expressly tailored solely for the benefit of 
113. Id. § 1129(a)(15). 
114. Id. § 1129(a)(15)(A). 
115. Id. § 1129(a)(15)(B). 
116. See id. § 1127(a) (providing for preconfirmation modification of a Chapter 11 
plan). 
117. Recall that, pursuant to Justice Scalia’s interpretation, the phrase "property to be 
distributed" signals discounting for default risk. Supra notes 99–100 and accompanying 
text. 
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unsecured creditors,118  the Chapter 11 disposable-income requirement does 
not identify any specific class of beneficiary.119 
This absurd result can be avoided by interpreting the phrase "property 
to be distributed under the plan" in the manner suggested by Justice 
Thomas—that is, that the phrase does not mandate adjusting the present-
value discount rate for risk of default. This analysis, however, merely 
demonstrates that Justice Scalia was incorrect to interpret the phrase as 
signifying the need for risk adjustment to the discount rate. Justice 
Thomas’s analytical frame centers on the notion that it is the phrase "value, 
as of the effective date of the plan" that signifies the need for discounting, a 
frame that is consistent with the Code’s legislative history.120  The language 
of the phrase is broad enough to allow for the possibility that the discount 
rate must be adjusted for risk of default. The question thus becomes 
whether the phrase can be justifiably interpreted in this way. Because of 
the Code’s express silence on this issue, one must look elsewhere within the 
Code’s structure for the answer. 
B. Contextualizing the Propriety of a Risk-Free Discount Rate 
As discussed above, both the plurality and dissenting opinions in Till 
identify various factors that ought to be used to calculate the risk 
adjustment to the discount rate used in present-value analysis.121  There are 
a total of five factors identified in the two opinions, with some overlap 
between the two opinions.122  Descriptively, one might recast these factors 
as an equation that yields the creditor’s expected losses in the event of 
118. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (requiring plan to provide "that all of the debtor’s 
projected disposable income . . . will be applied to make payments to unsecured creditors 
under the plan"). 
119. See Markell, supra note 101, at 80 (noting that "[d]isposable income under chapter 
11 need only be part of the ‘property to be distributed under the plan,’ which presumably 
means some of it may be devoted to secured creditors and postpetition administrative 
claimants" (footnote omitted)). 
120. See supra notes 36, 39 (citing relevant legislative history). 
121. Supra notes 57, 64 and accompanying text. 
122. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality 
opinion) ("The appropriate size of that risk adjustment depends, of course, on such factors as 
the circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, and the duration and feasibility of 
the reorganization plan."); id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he most relevant factors 
bearing on risk premium are (1) the probability of plan failure; (2) the rate of collateral 
depreciation; (3) the liquidity of the collateral market; and (4) the administrative expenses of 
enforcement."). 
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default by the debtor (i.e., failure to complete the proposed payments), 
where Pd represents the probability of default, Ca  represents the costs that 
would actually be incurred by the creditor in the event of default, and Ce 
represents the expected default costs: Ca  x Pd = Ce.
123  The amount Ce  is an 
amount that, according to the plurality and dissent, should be reflected in 
the total amount of property that the debtor’s plan proposes to distribute to 
a creditor when he or she implements the cramdown option.124  A 
contextual reading of the Code reveals that the amounts represented by both 
Ca  and Pd are irrelevant considerations in conducting present-value analysis 
because the Code takes these amounts into account elsewhere, either for 
purposes of plan confirmation or for purposes of creditor recovery. 
1. Probability of Default (Pd) 
To begin, consider the value represented by Pd—the probability of 
default by the debtor under the plan. Both the plurality and the dissent 
identified Pd as a central component of risk adjustment for present-value 
analysis. While the dissent referred to "the probability of plan failure,"125 
the plurality elaborated on the concept by referring to "the duration and 
feasibility of the reorganization plan."126  In light of the plurality’s 
elaboration, one might conceive of Pd as a function of both (1) plan length 
(i.e., duration) and (2) the debt burden the proposed plan imposes on the 
debtor (i.e., feasibility). It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that plan 
length and debt burden should inform the likelihood of successfully 
completing a Chapter 13 plan. A recent empirical study of case outcomes 
in Chapter 13,127  however, suggests that only the former may be relevant. 
That study found that plans of shorter duration were statistically 
significantly associated with higher rates of completion.128  On the other 
123. Cf. id. at 503 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (providing an example of how a creditor’s 
expected default costs would be calculated). 
124. See id. at 479 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) ("Because bankrupt debtors typically 
pose a greater risk of nonpayment than solvent commercial borrowers, the [formula] 
approach then requires a bankruptcy court to adjust the prime rate accordingly."); id. at 491 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A]ny deferred payments to a secured creditor must fully 
compensate it for the risk that . . . [plan] failure will occur."). 
125. Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
126. Id. at 479 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
127. Scott F. Norberg & Nadja Schreiber Compo, Report on an Empirical Study of 
District Variations, and the Roles of Judges, Trustees and Debtors’ Attorneys in Chapter 13 
Bankruptcy Cases, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 431 (2007). 
128. Id. at 454; see also In re Wirth, No. 09-12428-13, 2010 WL 2639873, at *2 
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hand, the study did not find any statistically significant association between 
the percentage of unsecured debt sought to be repaid and plan 
completion.129  Of course, it may be that, if one were to look at other 
measures of debt burden, such as the amount of secured debt sought to be 
repaid or debt-to-income ratios, a statistically significant association would 
be unearthed. Nevertheless, no one would dispute that a plan’s terms, when 
considered on a case-by-case basis, ought to provide some picture of the 
risk of default under the plan.130 
The relevant question, however, is whether risk of default is a relevant 
factor for purposes of present-value analysis. A contextual reading of the 
Code suggests that risk of default should not be relevant in calculating the 
discount rate given that financial feasibility is a confirmation standard 
distinct from the cramdown confirmation standard. Code § 1325(a)(6) 
provides that a Chapter 13 plan can be confirmed only if "the debtor will be 
able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan."131 
Both the plurality and the dissent took note of this provision in their 
respective opinions,132  but neither reached the conclusion that the provision 
(Bankr. W.D. Wis. June 28, 2010) (noting a higher dismissal rate for five-year plans than for 
three- or four-year repayment plans in the Western District of Wisconsin during the ten-year 
period beginning on January 1, 1995 and ending on December 31, 2004). The statistically 
significant association did not persist, however, when separating the dismissed cases into 
pre-confirmation and post-confirmation cases and comparing the plan length of each 
category to the plan length of successfully completed cases. Norberg & Compo, supra note 
127, at 454 n.64. Even with this alternate grouping, though, the association between plan 
length and plan completion approached the conventional standard of statistical significance 
(p ≤ 0.05), as indicated by the p-value of 0.093. Id. 
129. Norberg & Compo, supra note 127, at 456. 
130. For a summary of the various theories explaining the high failure rate of Chapter 
13 plans, see 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 234. 
131. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6) (2006) (emphasis added). Courts use the term "feasibility" 
to describe the confirmation requirement set forth in Code § 1325(a)(6). See, e.g., In re St. 
Cloud and Jeudi, 209 B.R. 801, 809 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1997). The influence for doing so 
likely stems from the Code’s legislative history, which states that "[t]he bankruptcy court 
must confirm a [Chapter 13] plan if . . . the plan is feasible," among other things. S. REP. 
NO. 95-989, at 142 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5928. The legislative 
history’s reference to feasibility, in turn, likely derives from the pre-Code confirmation 
standard for Chapter XIII plans that required a court to find that the plan was "feasible." 
Infra note 135. 
132. Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion directly quotes the provision as one example 
of the "multiple creditor-specific protections" that evidence Congress’s intent "not to provide 
further protection for creditors by requiring a debtor-specific risk adjustment under 
§ 1325(a)(5)." Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 490 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring); 
see also Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 329–30 ("Justice Thomas, in essence, assumes that all 
promised payments will be made."). 
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precludes taking account of the risk of nonpayment when discounting to 
present value the debtor’s proposed payments. The plurality merely 
observed that the financial-feasibility requirement serves to reduce the 
amount of default risk, but does not completely eliminate such risk.133  On 
the other hand, the dissent took the view that the requirement generally 
does not reduce the risk of default.134  In their discussions of the financial-
feasibility requirement, both the plurality and dissent referred to empirical 
evidence indicating a high rate of Chapter 13 plan failure,135  a phenomenon 
that continues to be empirically documented.136  Both the plurality and 
133. Till, 541 U.S. at 475 & n.12, 480 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
134. See id. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that many confirmed Chapter 13 plans 
fail and concluding that the high failure rate "proves that bankruptcy judges are not oracles 
and that trustees cannot draw blood from a stone"). 
135. Id. at 480 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); id. at 493 & n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the Bankruptcy Code’s predecessor. Act of July 1, 1898, 
ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). The 1898 Act allowed individual debtors to repay 
their creditors through a court-supervised repayment plan under Chapter XIII of the Act, 
which was enacted in 1938. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 930–38. The 
historical record suggests that Chapter XIII wage-earner plans had a low rate of completion. 
Bankruptcy Act Revision: Hearings on H.R. 31 and H.R. 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil 
and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 1327–28 (1976) 
(testimony of Hon. Conrad K. Cyr, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, District of Maine). This 
occurred despite the financial-feasibility requirement for plan confirmation. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1056(a)(3) (1976) (requiring court to confirm Chapter XIII plan "if satisfied that . . . [the 
plan] is feasible," among other requirements) (repealed 1978). The low success rate may 
have been partly attributable to an excess of repayment optimism by debtors. COMM’N ON 
THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF 
THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93–137, pt. 1, at 160 (1973); Henry A. Bundschu, 
Administration of Wage Earners’ Plans in the Bankruptcy Court, 18 J. NAT’L ASS’N REF. 
BANKR. 55, 56 (1944). For an empirical account of outcomes in Chapter XIII cases filed in 
five cities during the three years following Chapter XIII’s enactment, see Frederick 
Woodbridge, Wage Earners’ Plans in the Federal Courts, 26 MINN. L. REV. 775, 818–19 
(1942). For a historical discussion on the origins of Chapter XIII, see Timothy W. Dixon & 
David G. Epstein, Where Did Chapter 13 Come from and Where Should It Go?, 10 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 741 (2002). 
136. According to an empirical study of Chapter 13 cases that were filed in 1994 in 
seven federal judicial districts, 351 of the 613 confirmed cases in the study’s sample were 
either dismissed or converted to Chapter 7. Scott F. Norberg & Andrew J. Velkey, Debtor 
Discharge and Creditor Repayment in Chapter 13, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 473, 479, 506 
tbl.19 (2006); see also 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 233 ("For more than 
a decade, two-thirds of all Chapter 13 plans have failed before the debtor completes 
payments, and sometimes before unsecured creditors have received anything at all."); cf. 
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 15, at 64 tbl.6 (reporting that, of the 145,940 
Chapter 13 cases dismissed during the 2009 calendar year, 71,114 cases (approximately 
49%) were dismissed because of the debtor’s failure to make payments under the plan). Put 
another way, the bankruptcy courts in the study erroneously determined the financial 
feasibility of plan success in 57% of the confirmed cases. 
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dissent chided bankruptcy courts for the high incidence of plan failure,137 
but they diverged in their assessment of the implications of such failure in 
conducting present-value analysis: The dissent took the view that the status 
quo will continue, such that the risk adjustment should not be offset by the 
financial-feasibility requirement;138  whereas the plurality took the view that 
there should be some offset.139 
What both the plurality and dissent fail to appreciate is that the 
financial-feasibility requirement is framed as an all-or-nothing proposition: 
The debtor will either be able or unable to make all payments.140  There is 
no middle ground. Section 1325(a)(6) does not permit a court to confirm a 
plan if it believes that the debtor will be able to make only some of the 
payments under the plan. The court may only confirm if it is convinced 
that the debtor will make all payments under the plan.141  In other words, 
the court must be convinced that Pd = 0 for all confirmed plans. 
If Pd = 0 for a confirmed plan, then there are no expected default costs 
at the time of plan confirmation (i.e., Ce  = 0). Accordingly, when a court 
factors in any expected default cost into its present-value analysis, it does 
so in contravention of the statutory scheme for plan confirmation. Any 
time a court adjusts the discount rate for risk of nonpayment, it essentially 
137. See Till, 541 U.S. at 482–83 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) ("Perhaps bankruptcy 
judges currently confirm too many risky plans, but the solution is to confirm fewer such 
plans, not to set default cramdown rates at absurdly high levels, thereby increasing the risk 
of default."); id. at 493 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("That so many nonetheless failed proves that 
bankruptcy judges are not oracles and that trustees cannot draw blood from a stone."). 
Admittedly, a focus on plan failure as a metric for the effectiveness of Chapter 13 relief may 
be too narrow. Norberg & Velkey, supra note 136, at 504; Woodbridge, supra note 135, at 
819–20. 
138. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 497 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(noting that full compensation "cannot be attained by high-risk-plans and low interest rates, 
which, absent cause to anticipate a change in confirmation practices, is precisely what the 
formula approach would yield"). 
139. See id. at 482–83 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion) ("Perhaps bankruptcy judges 
currently confirm too many risky plans, but the solution is to confirm fewer such plans, not 
to set default cramdown rates at absurdly high levels, thereby increasing the risk of 
default."). 
140. See 11 U.S.C. 1325(a)(6) (2006) (stating that a court shall confirm a plan if "the 
debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply with the plan" 
(emphasis added)). 
141. See Till, 541 U.S. at 490 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that "a bankruptcy court 
must ensure that ‘the debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan and to comply 
with the plan’" (emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6)); cf. United Student Aid 
Funds, Inc. v. Espinosa, 130 S. Ct. 1367, 1381 n.14 (2010) (stating that Code § 1325(a) 
"requires bankruptcy courts to address and correct a defect in a debtor’s proposed plan even 
if no creditor raises the issue"). 
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admits that Pd > 0. A court, however, must deny plan confirmation when 
that condition arises. To make matters worse, allowing such a risk 
premium essentially allows a creditor in certain circumstances (e.g., a no-
asset case)142  to insure against plan default through the equivalent of an 
unearned lien on the debtor’s postbankruptcy income—at the expense of 
unsecured creditors.143  Any increase in the discount rate will reduce the 
present value of the proposed cash flows under the debtor’s plan,144  with the 
result that the debtor will have to increase the amount of payments so that 
their present value is equal to the allowed amount of the creditor’s claim. 
The portion of the income stream that correlates to the default risk 
represents payments that, in the absence of the risk premium, would likely 
have been distributed to unsecured creditors.145 
142. A no-asset case is one in which the debtor does not have nonexempt assets 
available for distribution to unsecured creditors. Steven W. Rhodes, An Empirical Study of 
Consumer Bankruptcy Papers, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 653, 664 (1999). If such a case were 
administered under Chapter 7, no payment would be made to holders of allowed nonpriority, 
unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a). Accordingly, if a no-asset case is administered under 
Chapter 13, the debtor’s repayment plan will satisfy the best-interest test, even though it 
proposes not to make any payments to the class of general unsecured creditors. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1325(a)(4); supra notes 28–31 and accompanying text. A similar situation would arise if 
the debtor did have nonexempt assets available for distribution, but those assets did not have 
sufficient value—if the case were administered under Chapter 7—to exceed the amount of 
allowed priority unsecured claims. In such a case, no payment would be made to holders of 
allowed nonpriority unsecured claims. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a). 
143. See In re Scott, 248 B.R. 786, 789 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) ("[U]nless the debtor 
has sufficient disposable income to pay all claims in full during a Chapter 13 case, the rules 
for cramdown determine how the debtor’s plan payments are divided between secured and 
unsecured creditors—the higher the cramdown payments, the lower the payments to 
unsecured creditors."). I borrow the concept of a creditor acquiring an unearned lien through 
the bankruptcy process from Lawrence Ponoroff and F. Stephen Knippenberg. Lawrence 
Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Debtors Who Convert Their Assets on the Eve of 
Bankruptcy: Villains or Victims of the Fresh Start?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 235, 318–19 (1995). 
144. Consider the following present-value formula, where pv is present value, f is the 
income flow, i is the discount rate per compounding period, and n is the number of 
compounding periods: pv = f/(1 + i)n. C. Frank Carbiener, Present Value in Bankruptcy: 
The Search for an Appropriate Cramdown Discount Rate, 32 S.D. L. REV. 42, 44 (1987). 
When all other variables are held constant, pv decreases as i increases. 
145. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B) (providing that, upon objection by the trustee or an 
unsecured creditor, a court may not approve a plan unless "the plan provides that all of the 
debtor’s projected disposable income to be received in the applicable commitment period 
beginning on the date that the first payment is due . . . will be applied to make payments to 
unsecured creditors"); see also 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 261 ("[I]n 
the current Chapter 13 system, the amount of money allocated to interest payments on 
secured debt is deducted directly from the amount that otherwise would be available for 
distribution to unsecured creditors."). The possibility exists, of course, that the surplus 
disposable income in the absence of a risk premium could be sufficient to permit the debtor 
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It may be argued that, when a court concludes that a debtor will be 
able to make all payments under the plan, setting Pd at zero in the formula 
for expected default costs results in an inappropriately narrow construction 
of the Code’s financial-feasibility requirement for Chapter 13 plans. The 
premise for this argument would be that the standard of proof associated 
with a finding of financial feasibility does not require a court to predict with 
absolute certainty successful completion of the repayment plan. Assuming 
that the correct standard of proof for confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan is 
preponderance of the evidence (the POE standard),146  a court need only find 
that it is more likely than not that the debtor will be able to make all 
payments under the plan.147  In quantitative terms, the court can make such 
a finding if it is convinced that there is at least a 0.501 probability 
(rounding to the nearest thousandth) of all proposed payments being 
made.148  From this probability assessment, one could calculate for purposes 
of present-value analysis a corresponding probability of default under the 
plan and incorporate the figure as Pd in the formula for expected default 
costs.149 
to retain additional property through cramdown. In this case, the beneficiary of a risk-free 
discount rate would be the holder of the crammed-down claim, rather than the general 
unsecured creditors. Also, in those instances where the debtor proposes to pay 100% of the 
unsecured claims, a risk-adjusted discount rate would not present the problem of the 
unearned lien. 
146. See In re Santiago, 404 B.R. 564, 570 n.8 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2009) ("While the 
standard of proof [for Chapter 13 plan confirmation] seems generally recognized as 
‘preponderance of the evidence,’ there are some courts that require proof by clear and 
convincing evidence." (citations omitted)); cf. Fin. Sec. Assurance Inc. v. T-H New Orleans 
Ltd. P’ship (In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. P’ship), 116 F.3d 790, 801 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(applying the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in the context of Chapter 11 plan 
confirmation); Heartland Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Briscoe Enter., Ltd., II (In re Briscoe 
Enter., Ltd., II), 994 F.2d 1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1993) (same); United States v. Arnold & 
Baker Farms (In re Arnold & Baker Farms), 177 B.R. 648, 655 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994) 
(same); In re Charles, 334 B.R. 207, 216 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005) ("Absent a statute or rule 
to the contrary, the burden of proof in a bankruptcy case is by a preponderance of the 
evidence."). I borrow the phrase "POE standard" from Saul Levmore. Saul Levmore, 
Conjunction and Aggregation, 99 MICH. L. REV. 723, 726 (2001). 
147. See In re Arnold & Baker Farms, 177 B.R. at 654 ("Proof by the preponderance of 
the evidence means that it is sufficient to persuade the finder of fact that the proposition is 
more likely true than not."). 
148. See, e.g., Neil Cohen, Confidence in Probability: Burdens of Persuasion in a 
World of Imperfect Knowledge, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 385, 399 (1985) (stating that the POE 
standard is satisfied if the probability exceeds 0.5); Levmore, supra note 146, at 725–26 
(same). 
149. Any skepticism regarding the inclination of courts to conduct likelihood 
assessments in resolving disputes that arise under the Bankruptcy Code can be dismissed. 
Courts have calculated such probabilities, for example, when valuing a debtor’s contingent 
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Imagine, for example, that a court finds it more likely than not that the 
debtor will be able to make all payments under the plan. This represents an 
affirmative answer to the binary question of whether the financial-
feasibility requirement—that is, 100% payment by the Chapter 13 debtor— 
has been met by the POE standard, which is the equivalent of saying that 
there is more than a 0.5 chance of a successful repayment plan. The extent 
to which the quantum of proof offered by the debtor exceeds the POE 
standard will surely vary across different cases. The court’s assessment, for 
example, may be that the evidence presented suggests a 0.8 likelihood of a 
successful repayment plan.150  In this example, the court can hold that the 
financial-feasibility requirement has been satisfied and then proceed to use 
this information in calculating risk of default for purposes of present-value 
analysis. The court’s assessment of a 0.8 chance of successful plan is 
similarly an assessment of a 0.2 chance of the debtor not making all 
payments under the plan—in other words, plan default. Thus, the court 
could set Pd in the formula for expected default costs to 0.2. 
On this account, one can reconcile a finding of financial feasibility 
with the incorporation of a premium for risk of default into the discount rate 
used for present-value analysis. The risk factor merely represents the 
degree of uncertainty of plan completion perceived by the court, even 
though the court ultimately concludes that the debtor, more likely than not, 
will succeed.151  To calculate Pd in the formula for expected default costs, 
one merely subtracts the court’s likelihood assessment of financial 
feasibility—that is, the probability of successful repayment (represented by 
Ps)—from 1. Thus, Pd = 1 − Ps. Because the POE standard requires that Ps 
liabilities for purposes of determining the debtor’s insolvency. See, e.g., Covey v. 
Commercial Nat’l Bank of Peoria, 960 F.2d 657, 660 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Discounting a 
contingent liability by the probability of its occurrence is good economics and therefore 
good law, for solvency, the key to § 548(a)(2), is an economic term."). 
150. Put another way, the court would reason that, if it were to observe the proffered 
evidence ten times, the court would conclude eight times that the debtor would make all 
payments under the plan and would conclude two times that the debtor would fail to make 
all payments under the plan. 
151. Epstein & Fuller, supra note 40, at 909. In further support of this point by way of 
analogy, it has been stated that, in conducting present-value analysis under the best-interests 
test in Chapter 11, a court must account for the probability of success of the reorganization 
plan in addition to the discount rate. Timothy C.G. Fisher & Jocelyn Martel, Does It Matter 
How Bankruptcy Judges Evaluate the Creditors’ Best-Interests Test?, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
497, 498, 500–01 (2007). Interestingly, however, because this prescription separates the 
discount rate and the likelihood of successful reorganization into distinct analytical concepts, 
it suggests that the discount rate ought to be a risk-free rate that accounts only for the time 
value of money (i.e., opportunity cost and expected inflation). 
RECONCEPTUALIZING PRESENT-VALUE ANALYSIS 	 147 
exceed 0.5, it follows that, when rounding to the nearest thousandth, Ps  will 
have a lower bound of 0.501 and an upper bound of 1.000 (i.e., 0.501 ≤ Ps  ≤ 
1.000). Consequently, the value for Pd in the formula for expected default 
costs could range from 0.000 to 0.499, notwithstanding the court’s finding 
of financial feasibility. 
This "flexible approach" undoubtedly has pragmatic appeal. It gives a 
court the flexibility of confirming a plan not guaranteed to succeed, but 
nonetheless having reasonable prospects for success. Moreover, the 
approach allows a court to mitigate its prediction error by compensating 
creditors through the incorporation of a risk factor into the discount rate for 
present-value analysis.152  Were courts required to predict with certainty the 
successful completion of a Chapter 13 plan, they would likely confirm 
fewer Chapter 13 plans, which would result in a higher incidence of 
dismissed or converted Chapter 13 cases.153  This would likely deter debtors 
from filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 13, thus undermining Congress’s 
intent to encourage greater use of the chapter by individual debtors.154 
The flexible approach fails to account, however, for a key difference 
between the financial-feasibility standards for the confirmation of Chapter 
11 and Chapter 13 plans. That difference suggests that a finding of 
financial feasibility ought to result in distinct approaches for incorporating 
risk of default when conducting present-value analysis under the two 
chapters. Whereas the financial-feasibility requirement for confirmation of 
a Chapter 13 plan requires a court to find that "the debtor will be able to 
make all payments under the plan,"155  the Chapter 11 analogue only 
requires a court to find that "[c]onfirmation of the plan is not likely to be 
followed by the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, 
of the debtor . . . , unless such liquidation or reorganization is proposed in 
152. Even under this approach, there will be instances in which the prediction error is 
not completely mitigated—specifically, those cases where it is more likely than not that the 
debtor’s plan will fail, but the court concludes otherwise. In such cases, the probability of 
plan default will be greater than or equal to 0.501. By virtue of its erroneous finding of 
financial feasibility, however, the court will not be able to set Pd in the formula for expected 
default costs any higher than the upper bound of 0.499. Accordingly, in such cases, the 
prediction error will not be mitigated to the extent that the actual probability of plan default 
exceeds the predicted probability of plan default. 
153. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c)(5) (2006) (providing that a court may convert or dismiss a 
Chapter 13 case for cause, including "denial of confirmation of a plan . . . and denial of a 
request made for additional time for filing another plan or a modification of a plan"). 
154. See 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 233 ("The legislative history 
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 establishes that Congress sought to promote the use 
of Chapter 13 in appropriate cases."). 
155. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(6). 
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the plan."156  Because the standard of proof for Chapter 11 plan 
confirmation is a preponderance of the evidence, a court need only find that 
it is more likely than not that the Chapter 11 plan is not likely to fail.157  A 
court required to make a finding of the financial feasibility of a Chapter 11 
plan thus faces what can be described as "two more-likely-than-not 
assessments,"158  which has significant implications when importing the 
flexible approach into the Chapter 11 context.159 
As in Chapter 13,160  confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan will generally 
require a court to conduct present-value analysis, which is indicated by the 
identical language "value, as of the effective date of the plan."161  Assuming 
that it is appropriate in Chapter 11 cases to implement the Chapter 13 
framework for conducting present-value analysis,162  one would conduct the 
analysis by calculating expected default costs. To ascertain expected 
default costs, one would have to estimate the probability of default (Pd) 
under the Chapter 11 plan. Under the flexible approach, Pd = 1 − Ps, with 
Ps  representing the probability of a successful Chapter 11 reorganization. 
In turn, Ps  is derived from the court’s financial-feasibility determination. 
As mentioned before, such a determination involves two probability 
estimates—specifically, (1) whether it is more likely than not that (2) the 
plan is likely to succeed. The first estimate represents the POE standard, 
156. Id. § 1129(a)(11) (emphasis added). Similar to the Chapter 13 context, the Code’s 
legislative history uses the term "feasibility" to describe the confirmation requirement set 
forth in Code § 1129(a)(11). See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 128 (1978) ("Paragraph (11) 
requires a determination regarding feasibility of the plan."), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5787, 5914; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 413 (1977) ("Paragraph (11) contains the feasibility 
standards."), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6369. For further discussion regarding 
the Chapter 11 feasibility standards, see, for example, Financial Security Assurance Inc. v. 
T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership (In re T-H New Orleans Ltd. Partnership), 116 F.3d 790, 
801 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Arts Dairy, LLC, 432 B.R. 712, 716–17 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2010). 
157. See supra note 146 (citing case law supporting the proposition that the standard of 
proof for Chapter 11 plan confirmation is preponderance of the evidence). 
158. Levmore, supra note 146, at 742. 
159. See supra note 40 (citing authorities in support of the proposition that the present-
value provisions should be consistently interpreted throughout the Code). 
160. See supra notes 31, 34 and accompanying text (quoting Chapter 13 present-value 
provisions). 
161. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7), (a)(9), (a)(15)(A), (b)(2)(A)(i)(II), (b)(2)(B)(i), 
(b)(2)(C)(i); cf. Epstein & Fuller, supra note 40, at 905 ("[B]oth section 1129 of Chapter 11 
and section 1325 of Chapter 13 test the adequacy of a plan’s deferred cash payments to the 
holder of a secured claim by looking to the ‘value, as of the effective date of the plan’ of the 
deferred cash payments."). 
162. See supra note 40 (citing authorities in support of the proposition that the present-
value provisions should be consistently interpreted throughout the Bankruptcy Code). 
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and the second estimate represents the financial-feasibility requirement. 
Unlike the Chapter 13 feasibility requirement, which is framed as a binary 
assessment (i.e., whether the debtor will make all payments), the Chapter 
11 feasibility requirement is framed as an interval assessment (i.e., the 
likelihood of the plan succeeding). Calculating Ps  thus presents the issue of 
conjunctive probability and implicates use of the "product rule," whereby 
the probability associated with the POE standard and the probability 
associated with the feasibility standard will be multiplied in order to 
calculate the combined likelihood that yields Ps.
163 
In quantitative terms, the court can make a Chapter 11 feasibility 
finding if it is convinced that there is at least a 0.501 probability (again, 
rounding to the nearest thousandth) that plan confirmation will not likely be 
followed by liquidation or further financial reorganization. The latter 
condition can be reclassified and quantified as a finding that, at a minimum, 
there exists a 0.501 probability of successful reorganization. Accordingly, 
when multiplying the quantified confirmation standard (which could range 
from 0.501 to 1.000) by the quantum of proof (which could range from 
0.501 to 1.000), a court could make a finding of financial feasibility in the 
Chapter 11 context where the predicted probability of plan success ranges 
from a lower bound of 0.251 (i.e., a finding of a 0.501 probability of 
successful reorganization multiplied by the 0.501 quantum of proof) to an 
upper bound of 1.000 (i.e., a finding of a 1.000 probability of successful 
reorganization multiplied by a 1.000 quantum of proof). In other words, 
0.251 < Ps  < 1.000. 
Consider the implication of implementing the flexible approach in the 
Chapter 11 context. Under that approach, Pd = 1 − Ps. Given the range of 
Ps, the value for Pd in the formula for expected default costs could range 
from 0.000 to 0.749. The conjunction issue presented by the Chapter 11 
feasibility standard gives rise to the possibility that, if one were to 
implement the flexible approach, Pd could exceed 0.500 for purposes of 
Chapter 11 present-value analysis. More specifically, there would be a 
range of cases where 0.501 < Pd < 0.749. For such cases, implementing the 
flexible approach would entail use of a discount rate that would compensate 
creditors (under a confirmed plan) at a level reflecting plan failure rather 
than plan success. Such a result would be demonstrably at odds with the 
notion of a confirmed plan as being one that "is not likely to be followed by 
163. See Levmore, supra note 146, at 723 (describing application of the "product rule"). 
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the liquidation, or the need for further financial reorganization, of the 
debtor."164 
To avoid this absurd result, a court would have to dispense with 
application of the product rule. Once a court was satisfied that the POE 
threshold of 0.501 had been met or exceeded, the court would take what 
had been proven as a given—specifically, that successful reorganization 
was more likely than not (i.e., Ps  ≥ 0.501). A finding of financial feasibility 
in the Chapter 11 context would thus entail an estimate within the range of 
0.501 ≤ Ps  ≤ 1.000. This, in turn, would allow for a sensible application of 
the flexible approach in Chapter 11 pursuant to which creditors would be 
compensated according to a discount rate reflecting successful 
reorganization (as a result of 0.000 ≤ Pd ≤ 0.499). 
If the flexible approach can be sensibly applied only by taking what 
has been proven as a given, then a court that makes a finding of financial 
feasibility in the Chapter 13 context must calculate the discount rate for 
present-value analysis on the assumption that the "debtor will be able to 
make all payments under the plan."165  Under the assumption Pd = 0, there 
are no expected default costs (i.e., Ce  = 0). It is important to note that this 
line of argument does not contradict the proposition that present-value 
analysis should be applied consistently across the different Code 
chapters.166  The argument offered here began with the idea that the 
discount rate can be reframed as a formula for expected default costs. 
Although the formula remains constant across Code chapters, Pd is 
calculated differently in Chapter 13 than in Chapter 11 by virtue of the 
distinct financial-feasibility requirements of the two chapters. Thus, the 
expected-default-costs framework can be applied equally in both chapters 
while simultaneously recognizing and giving effect to their substantive 
differences in confirmation standards. 
2. Actual Default Costs (Ca) 
Solely on the basis of this contextualized reading of the Code, one 
could conclude that the discount rate must be a risk-free rate. For the sake 
of argument, however, assume that taking account of the likelihood of plan 
failure is appropriate—that is, that a court may confirm a plan 
164. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11). 
165. Id. § 1325(a)(6). 
166. See supra note 40 (citing authorities in support of the proposition that the present-
value provisions should be consistently interpreted throughout the Bankruptcy Code). 
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notwithstanding that Pd > 0 and that the court may factor this into its 
present-value analysis. One must still answer whether the amounts 
represented by Ca  should be factored into present-value analysis. If none of 
those factors may be taken into account when calculating the risk-adjusted 
discount rate, this would be the equivalent of saying that Ca  = 0 in 
calculating expected default costs. Under that condition, Ce  also equals 
zero, thereby yielding a riskless discount rate. 
The factors identified by the plurality as producing default costs relate 
to (1) the value of the collateral securing the creditor’s allowed secured 
claim and (2) presumably the degree of insolvency of the debtor’s estate 
(i.e., the degree to which the sum of the claims against the estate exceed 
estate property available for distribution).167  The factors identified by the 
dissent as producing default costs relate to (1) the value of the collateral 
securing the creditor’s allowed secured claim, (2) the illiquidity of 
foreclosed or repossessed collateral, and (3) the enforcement of security 
rights in the bankruptcy forum.168  Each of these factors will be considered 
in turn, and it will be shown that the Code allows recovery for some of 
these costs pursuant to procedures outside the confirmation process and 
precludes recovery of the remaining costs. 
a. Default Costs Relating to Collateral Value 
First, consider default costs relating to the value of the collateral 
securing the creditor’s allowed secured claim, a factor identified by both the 
plurality and the dissent. According to the plurality opinion, risk 
adjustment should be dictated partly by "the nature of the security."169  The 
dissenting opinion is more specific than the plurality, identifying "the rate 
of collateral depreciation" as a "relevant factor[] bearing on risk 
premium."170  Given the plurality’s broader statement, one might reasonably 
conclude that concern over the nature of the security includes not only 
depreciation, but also destruction or loss of the collateral. When a debtor 
167. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality 
opinion) ("The appropriate size of th[e] risk adjustment depends . . . on such factors as the 
circumstances of the estate, the nature of the security, and the duration and feasibility of the 
reorganization plan."). 
168. See id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he most relevant factors bearing on risk 
premium are (1) the probability of plan failure; (2) the rate of collateral depreciation; (3) the 
liquidity of the collateral market; and (4) the administrative expenses of enforcement."). 
169. Id. at 479 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
170. Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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retains property subject to a creditor’s security interest and does so over the 
objection of the creditor, the concern arises that, in the event of default, if 
the collateral has depreciated or has been destroyed, then the creditor will 
be left with a loss that it would not have suffered if it had been allowed to 
foreclose on the collateral in the first instance.171 	Under such 
circumstances, the retention of the lien by the creditor—which the plan 
must provide when the debtor exercises the cramdown option172—will be of 
little comfort. 
Congress, however, well aware of this problem when it drafted the 
Code, created a process by which a secured creditor can seek protection 
from the loss or declining value of its collateral. Before discussing this 
process, it is worth noting how and why the Code interferes with a 
creditor’s ability to enforce its security rights. When a debtor files for 
bankruptcy, a stay goes into effect automatically (without requiring court 
action) that prevents creditors from taking certain actions against the debtor 
and its estate.173  The automatic stay plays a fundamental role in protecting 
both debtors and creditors: It gives a debtor breathing room,174  and it 
"accords procedural relief to creditors in the form of an orderly, collective 
process that administers the assets of a debtor to its creditors as a response 
to the common pool problem that arises when a debtor has insufficient 
assets to repay his or her debts."175  The automatic stay therefore prohibits, 
among other acts, any act to obtain possession of estate property and any 
act to enforce a lien against estate property.176 
171. See id. at 502 ("The first cost of default involves depreciation. If the debtor 
defaults, the creditor can eventually repossess and sell the collateral, but by then it may be 
substantially less valuable than the remaining balance due—and the debtor may stop paying 
long before the creditor receives permission to repossess."). 
172. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I) (2006). 
173. See id. § 362(a) (listing acts that are stayed); Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 
106, 113 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Because the automatic stay is exactly what the name implies— 
‘automatic’—it operates without the necessity for judicial intervention."); FDIC v. Hirsch 
(In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125, 137 (2d Cir. 1992) ("[T]he automatic stay is 
imposed by Congressional mandate and not by court order. By its very terms, no action by 
any court is necessary for the stay to take effect." (citations omitted)). 
174. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297. 
175. Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: 
An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 414 
(2005); see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 49 (1978) (discussing how the automatic stay protects 
creditors), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5835; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 
(same), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297. 
176. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3), (5). 
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A creditor may seek relief from the automatic stay, however, if its 
interest in estate property is not adequately protected.177  The concept of 
adequate protection can be located within the Fifth Amendment and its 
protection of property interests, the idea being that a procedure should exist 
to ensure that the automatic stay does not unconstitutionally deprive a 
creditor’s nonbankruptcy property right to seize collateral pursuant to its 
security agreement with the debtor.178  As a matter of policy, the concept of 
adequate protection recognizes that giving a secured creditor the absolute 
right to its nonbankruptcy entitlement may undermine bankruptcy’s 
collective process; accordingly, adequate protection provides a secured 
creditor with the equivalent value of its nonbankruptcy entitlement rather 
than the entitlement itself.179  The Code provides three methods for 
adequately protecting a secured creditor’s interest in collateral that the 
debtor retains: (1) providing periodic cash payments to the creditor equal to 
the decrease in the value of the creditor’s interest in the collateral;180 
(2) granting the creditor an additional lien or substitute lien on other 
property equal to the decrease in the value of the creditor’s interest in the 
collateral;181  or (3) other protection, other than providing an administrative 
expense claim to the creditor, that will result in the creditor realizing the 
indubitable equivalent of the value of its interest in the collateral.182 
In general terms, a creditor’s interest will be adequately protected only 
if the creditor’s allowed secured claim, which is determined by reference to 
the value of the collateral securing the claim,183  remains fully secured 
throughout the life of the debtor’s repayment plan.184  If this condition 
obtains, then the creditor will, at a minimum, be able to realize the amount 
it would have received had the creditor been allowed to seize the collateral 
and liquidate it on the petition date.185  To see why this is the case, consider 
177. Id. § 362(d)(1). 
178. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 339, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6295. 
179. Id. 
180. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1). 
181. Id. § 361(2). 
182. Id. § 361(3). 
183. See id. § 506(a) ("An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in 
which the estate has interest . . . is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such 
creditor’s interest in the estate’s interest in such property . . . ."). 
184. Americredit Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Nichols (In re Nichols), 440 F.3d 850, 857 n.6 (6th 
Cir. 2006). 
185. In Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 cases involving an individual debtor, the standard for 
valuing collateral that consists of personal property is replacement value. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 506(a)(2). This value is obviously higher than liquidation value. Accordingly, when 
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the simple dynamic of repayment under the cramdown option. Recall that, 
when a debtor invokes the cramdown option, the debtor’s plan must 
propose that the creditor retain the lien securing its claim.186  Payments to 
the creditor have the effect of reducing the amount of debt outstanding. 
The only way that a creditor’s allowed secured claim will become 
undersecured is if the rate of decline in the value of the collateral (whether 
because of depreciation or loss) exceeds the rate of repayment. Thus, so 
long as the rate of repayment exceeds the rate of decline in value, the 
creditor’s interest will be adequately protected.187  In the event that the 
debtor’s plan fails, and the case is either converted to Chapter 7 or 
dismissed, the outstanding debt owed on the allowed secured claim will be 
fully covered by the value of the collateral as a result of the retained lien,188 
thereby permitting complete recovery by the creditor. 
Given that the Code has an independent process for adequately 
protecting a creditor’s interest in collateral, any discount rate that 
compensates for expected default costs related to a decline in collateral 
value is inappropriate. An amendment in 2005 to the Chapter 13 
confirmation standards further confirms this.189 	Pursuant to that 
determining whether the present value of the proposed income payments under the Chapter 
13 cramdown option is equal to the allowed amount of a claim secured by personal property, 
the latter amount will be greater than what the creditor would have received through 
liquidation of the collateral at a foreclosure sale, since the allowed amount of the secured 
claim will be determined by reference to the replacement value of the collateral. Infra note 
269 and accompanying text. Thus, if the allowed secured claim has remained fully secured 
and the debtor has made some payments under the plan prior to default, it is highly likely 
that the creditor will have received more than it would have received upon immediate 
foreclosure (i.e., the surplus represented by the difference between the plan payments 
actually made under a replacement-value standard and what those payments would have 
been under a liquidation-value standard). 
186. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(i). 
187. If the rate of decline in collateral value exceeds the rate of repayment required by 
the cramdown option, a debtor would be able to use the options provided in the Code’s 
adequate protection provision to rectify the situation. For example, the debtor could increase 
the amount of periodic payments in order to offset the rate of depreciation. Id. § 361(1). 
Alternatively, the debtor could give the creditor an additional or substitute lien on property 
whose value is determined not to decline during the life of the plan. Id. § 362(2). 
188. See id. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(II) (requiring Chapter 13 plan to provide that, upon 
dismissal or conversion of the case prior to completion of the plan, the secured creditor will 
retain its lien to the extent recognized by applicable nonbankruptcy law). A lien generally 
passes through bankruptcy unaffected. Id. § 506(d); Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 417 
(1992); H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 357 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6313. 
The Bankruptcy Code does provide mechanisms for lien avoidance, none of which is 
relevant to discussion here. E.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(d), 544–548. 
189. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 
RECONCEPTUALIZING PRESENT-VALUE ANALYSIS 	 155 
amendment, when a debtor invokes the cramdown option with respect to a 
creditor whose claim is secured by personal property and to whom the 
debtor proposes to make periodic payments, the Code now provides that 
"the amount of such payments shall not be less than an amount sufficient to 
provide to the holder of such claim adequate protection during the period of 
the plan."190  The amendment makes it quite clear that adequate-protection 
concerns are to be addressed distinctly from present-value analysis.191 
Thus, expected default costs related to declining collateral value should not 
be incorporated into the discount rate used for such analysis.192 
b. Default Costs Relating to Estate Insolvency 
Second, consider default costs relating to the degree of insolvency of 
the debtor’s estate (i.e., the degree to which the sum of the claims against 
the estate exceeds estate property available for distribution). Presumably, 
this is what the plurality opinion refers to when it states that "the 
circumstances of the estate" are a relevant factor in making an upward 
adjustment to the discount rate used in present-value analysis.193  This 
should not be a concern for creditors who have allowed secured claims. By 
virtue of their liens on property of the estate, that property (i.e., the 
collateral securing the claim) serves as a form of insurance against 
nonpayment.194  To the extent such creditors are concerned about the 
declining value of their collateral, they can demand adequate protection of 
their interests in the property. Because secured creditors have first claim to 
109-8, § 309(c)(1)(C), 119 Stat. 23, 83 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii) (2006)). 
190. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(iii)(II). 
191. Indeed, Justice Stevens argued in his dissenting opinion in Associates Commercial 
Corp. v. Rash that the loss of collateral value in a Chapter 13 case ought to be mitigated by 
adequate-protection payments and not present-value-interest payments. Assocs. Commercial 
Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953, 966 n.* (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). This makes all the 
more perplexing his reference in Till to the "nature of the security" as a relevant 
consideration in determining the risk adjustment to the discount rate used for present-value 
analysis. Supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
192. On this account, Justice Scalia’s focus on the expected default cost resulting from 
the depreciation in the value of collateral is misguided. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 
465, 502 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
193. Id. at 479 (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
194. See In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842, 847 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) ("[I]n case of 
default, the creditor can recover the remaining value of his claim by securing and disposing 
of the collateral."), abrogated by Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re 
Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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the estate assets in which they have an interest, they theoretically need not 
be concerned with the degree of insolvency of the debtor’s estate.195 
Unsecured creditors, on the other hand, would rightfully be concerned 
about the estate’s insolvency in the event of plan default. Recall, however, 
that the Chapter 13 confirmation standard for allowed unsecured claims 
focuses on whether the proposed distributions on account of such claims 
have a present value equal to the amount of property that would be 
distributed to such claims in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.196  Given 
that general unsecured claims in Chapter 7 receive a pro-rata distribution of 
nonexempt estate property remaining after payment to priority unsecured 
claims,197  it would be quite misguided to compensate general unsecured 
creditors in Chapter 13 for the loss which they would otherwise experience 
in Chapter 7.198  In light of these considerations, default costs relating to the 
degree of insolvency of the debtor’s estate should not be incorporated if 
calculating a risk-adjusted discount rate. 
c. Default Costs Relating to Collateral Illiquidity 
Third, consider default costs relating to the illiquidity of foreclosed or 
repossessed collateral. In his dissent, Justice Scalia observed that, in the 
event of default, a creditor would not be able to recover the replacement 
195. I say theoretically because of the possibility that, in the event the court determines 
that a creditor is entitled to adequate protection, that protection could prove to be 
inadequate—that is, the creditor’s allowed secured claim may end up undersecured because 
of a deficiency in the protection given to the creditor. When this occurs, the Code provides 
that the creditor will be allowed an administrative expense claim against the estate with 
priority over all other administrative expense claims. 11 U.S.C. § 507(b). If the debtor’s 
plan fails and the case is converted to Chapter 7, the Chapter 7 administrative expense 
claims will be paid before the Chapter 13 administrative expense claims. Id. § 726(b). If the 
debtor’s Chapter 7 estate is administratively insolvent, or if there are insufficient assets to 
pay the Chapter 13 administrative expense claims in full, the creditor will suffer a loss that it 
would not have suffered had the creditor been able to foreclose on its collateral when the 
debtor filed for bankruptcy. Under this limited set of circumstances, a creditor would be 
concerned over the degree of insolvency of the debtor’s estate. Nonetheless, this is an 
adequate-protection issue and thus not properly considered in the vein of present-value 
analysis. Supra Part III.B.2.a. 
196. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text (discussing application of present-
value analysis with respect to allowed unsecured claims). 
197. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a), (b) (specifying the order in which claims will be paid in 
Chapter 7 and requiring that payment be made on a pro rata basis). 
198. In fact, when Congress has desired to increase the distributions to general 
unsecured creditors in Chapter 13 over and above the amounts they would receive in Chapter 
7, it has expressly drafted Code provisions to this effect. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b)(1)(B). 
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value to which it is entitled in Chapter 13 when a debtor invokes the 
cramdown option.199  Instead, the creditor would receive "only a lesser 
foreclosure value because collateral markets are not perfectly liquid, and 
there is thus a spread between what a buyer will pay and what a seller will 
demand."200  In the 2005 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code,201  Congress 
clearly expressed its view that this is an expected default cost for which a 
secured creditor should not be compensated in bankruptcy. Pursuant to 
those amendments, in an individual debtor’s Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 case, 
the current standard for valuing collateral that consists of personal property 
is replacement value,202  a value that is obviously higher than liquidation 
value. Consider the implications of this valuation standard for creditor 
repayment in Chapter 7. 
Imagine a creditor has an allowed claim of $10,000 that is secured by 
property with a replacement value of $10,000 and a foreclosure value of 
$8,000. The trustee will abandon such property given both its burden to the 
estate as well as its inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.203  Once 
such property is abandoned and is no longer part of the estate, the automatic 
stay will no longer prohibit the creditor from enforcing its lien against the 
property.204  When the creditor forecloses, it will realize only $8,000, 
thereby suffering a loss of $2,000. The Code, however, will not entitle the 
creditor to recover this loss. Because the creditor will have been deemed to 
199. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 502 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
200. Id. at 502–03. 
201. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. 
No. 109-8, § 327, 119 Stat. 23, 99–100 (providing that, in an individual debtor’s Chapter 7 
or Chatper 13 case, "value with respect to personal property securing an allowed claim shall 
be determined based on the replacement value of such property") (codified at 11 U.S.C. 
§ 506(a)(2) (2006)). 
202. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(2). 
203. See id. § 554(a) (authorizing a trustee to abandon any property that is burdensome 
or of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate). A Chapter 7 trustee is accountable for 
all property received. Id. § 704(a)(2). As such, the estate will incur administrative costs in 
preserving the property (i.e., a burden). See id. § 330(a)(1)(B) (providing that a court may 
award to a trustee "reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses"); id. § 503(b)(2) 
(providing that reimbursement awarded under Code § 330(a) constitutes an administrative 
expense). The property, however, will generally not provide any value or benefit to the 
estate because the allowed amount of the creditor’s claim consumes the entire value of the 
property to which the creditor has first claim. Id. §§ 506(a)(1), 725. In other words, the 
property will not provide any value for distribution to the unsecured creditors. Under these 
circumstances, the trustee will abandon the property. 
204. See id. § 362(c)(1) ("[T]he stay of an act against property of the estate . . . 
continues until such property is no longer property of the estate."). 
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have had an allowed claim that was fully secured,205  the creditor will not 
have an unsecured claim entitling it to participate in distribution of 
nonexempt estate property to the holders of allowed unsecured claims.206 
Accordingly, if the Code precludes in Chapter 7 cases the recovery of 
expected default costs relating to the illiquidity of foreclosed or repossessed 
collateral, there is no principled reason to account for such costs were one 
to calculate a risk-adjusted discount rate. 
d. Default Costs Relating to Enforcement Actions 
Finally, consider default costs relating to the enforcement of a 
creditor’s security rights in the bankruptcy forum. Justice Scalia described 
the problem as follows: 
The third cost of default consists of the administrative expenses of 
foreclosure. While a Chapter 13 plan is in effect, the automatic stay 
prevents secured creditors from repossessing their collateral, even if the 
debtor fails to pay. The creditor’s attorney must move the bankruptcy 
court to lift the stay. . . . Moreover, bankruptcy judges will often excuse 
first offenses, so foreclosure may require multiple trips to court. The 
total expected administrative expenses in the event of default could 
reasonably be estimated at $600 or more.207 
Yet again, here is another instance in which the Code allows recovery 
for this type of expected default cost pursuant to a procedure outside of the 
confirmation process—specifically, the claim-allowance process. The 
definition of claim includes a contingent right to payment,208  and only 
creditors (i.e., entities with a pre-petition claim against the debtor)209  may 
file proofs of claim.210  Moreover, a claim cannot be disallowed merely 
because it is contingent.211  Finally, the Code authorizes a court to estimate 
205. See infra note 269 and accompanying text (explaining the manner in which the 
secured status of an allowed claim is determined). 
206. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(a) (establishing the order of distribution of estate property to 
unsecured creditors in Chapter 7 cases). 
207. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 503 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
208. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A). 
209. See id. § 101(10)(A) (defining creditor as an "entity that has a claim against the 
debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor"). For a 
discussion of the terms "pre-petition" and "post-petition," see infra note 245. 
210. 11 U.S.C. § 501(a). 
211. Id. § 502(b)(1). 
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for claim-allowance purposes "any contingent . . . claim, the fixing . . . of 
which . . . would unduly delay the administration of the case."212 
With these principles in mind, it should become clear that a creditor 
ought to be able to recover expected default costs relating to the 
administrative expenses of foreclosure through the claim-allowance 
process. Security agreements routinely provide that a creditor may recover 
collection costs incurred in enforcing the agreement.213  If carefully drafted, 
such a provision could include collection costs incurred while enforcing the 
agreement in the bankruptcy forum. Pursuant to that agreement, the 
creditor would have a pre-petition contingent right to recover collection 
costs in the bankruptcy forum.214  Accordingly, expected default costs 
arising from the administrative expenses of foreclosure should be recovered 
as part of a creditor’s allowed claim (i.e., the confirmation threshold for 
evaluating present-value analysis)215  rather than being incorporated into a 
216 risk-adjusted discount calculus. 
As the foregoing reveals, none of the factors identified by the plurality 
and dissent as producing expected default costs should be incorporated into 
the discount rate used for present-value analysis.217  In other words, a 
212. Id. § 502(c)(1). 
213. LYNN M. LOPUCKI & ELIZABETH WARREN, SECURED CREDIT: A SYSTEMS 
APPROACH 159 (6th ed. 2009). 
214. See Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443, 453– 
54 (2006) (stating that the Bankruptcy Code provision governing the allowance of claims 
does not prohibit an unsecured creditor from recovering attorneys’ fees authorized by a pre-
petition contract and incurred in post-petition litigation). 
215. See supra Part II.A (explaining the Chapter 13 confirmation threshold for secured 
and unsecured claims). 
216. The Court in Travelers did not address whether Code § 506(b) categorically 
disallows unsecured claims for contractual attorneys’ fees that arise under a pre-petition 
contract but are incurred post-petition. Travelers, 549 U.S. at 454–56; see also infra Part 
IV.B.1 (discussing Code § 506(b)). For the argument that Code § 506(b) does not disallow 
such claims, see, for example, Insurance Administrators, Inc. v. SNTL Corp. (In re SNTL 
Corp.), 380 B.R. 204, 218–20 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007), aff’d sub nom. SNTL Corp. v. Centre 
Insurance Co., 571 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2009); Qmect, Inc. v. Burlingame Capital Partners (In 
re Qmect, Inc.), 368 B.R. 882, 885–86 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2007). For the argument that Code 
§ 506(b) does disallow such claims, see, for example, Mark S. Scarberry, Interpreting 
Bankruptcy Code Sections 502 and 506: Post-Petition Attorneys’ Fees in a Post-Travelers 
World, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 611, 615 (2007). If the argument that such claims are 
disallowed is correct, then this further bolsters the conclusion that expected default costs 
relating to the enforcement of security rights in the bankruptcy court should not be 
incorporated into a risk-adjusted discount-rate calculus. If the Code generally precludes the 
recovery of such costs from the estate, there is no principled reason to allow their recovery 
in Chapter 13. 
217. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text (discussing factors identified by 
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contextual reading of the Code reveals that none of the amounts represented 
by Ca  should be taken into account when calculating a risk premium for the 
present-value discount rate. This is the equivalent of Ca  = 0. Thus, even if 
risk of default is a relevant factor such that one may account for the 
possibility that Pd > 0, the expected costs of default will nonetheless equal 
zero for purposes of calculating an appropriate discount rate. Under either 
view (i.e., Pd = 0 or Ca  = 0), the discount rate should be risk free rather than 
risk adjusted. 
C. A Discount Rate That Accounts Only for Expected Inflation 
Given that the Code compels use of a risk-free discount rate for 
present-value analysis, what about the Code further requires that the rate 
not include compensation for opportunity cost? Here, the answer lies in the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the scope of a secured creditor’s interest 
in collateral that must be adequately protected. Recall that a creditor may 
seek relief from the automatic stay on the basis of "lack of adequate 
protection of [the creditor’s] interest in property."218  In United Savings 
Bank Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,219  the Court 
unanimously held that the term "interest in property" does not include the 
foregone investment opportunity that results when the automatic stay 
prohibits immediate foreclosure and sale of the collateral securing the 
creditor’s claim.220  In other words, the Code prohibits compensation for 
opportunity cost. On this account, a discount rate for purposes of present-
value analysis should not seek to compensate the creditor for such cost. 
Prior to Till, at least one bankruptcy court, relying upon the Court’s 
decision in Timbers, took the view that the discount rate used for present-
value analysis should not compensate a creditor for opportunity cost. In In 
re Collins,221  which involved a dispute over the appropriate discount rate to 
be applied in a Chapter 13 cramdown,222  the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the 
Eastern District of Texas made the following observation: 
the plurality and dissent in Till that would produce expected default costs). 
218. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1) (2006). For further discussion on the topic of adequate 
protection, see supra Part III.B.2.a. 
219. United Savings Bank Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 
U.S. 365 (1988). 
220. Id. at 370–71, 82. 
221. In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994), abrogated by Green Tree 
Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997). 
222. Id. at 843–44. 
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The Timbers case is significant because the concept of adequate 
protection is closely analogous to the present value debate. In Timbers, 
adequate protection was held not to encompass the prevention of lost 
opportunity costs on behalf of a creditor. This Court views present value 
analysis in much the same way. What § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) attempts to 
remedy is the loss in value of money due solely to the passage of time 
much as a cost of living adjustment to an employee’s wage protects 
against inflation. Put simply, the concepts of present value and adequate 
protection are the same, they serve to protect the status quo.223  
In this statement, one witnesses that the Collins court conceptualized the 
time-value-of-money component of the discount rate merely as a function of 
expected inflation rather than expected inflation and opportunity cost. With 
an inflationary risk-free rate as a base rate, the Collins court adopted a 
methodology similar to the Till plurality’s formula approach—specifically, an 
upward adjustment to the base rate, which the Collins court described as "an 
additional risk factor of interest . . . based on the relevant considerations of 
the case."224  Although the Collins court acknowledged the inherent risk of 
plan failure in its discussion of the adjustment to the inflationary base rate,225 
the court clearly conceived of the adjustment as one intended to compensate a 
creditor for administrative and transaction costs rather than for the risk of 
nonpayment.226  Thus, in describing the proper methodology for calculating 
the present-value discount rate, "risk factor" appears to have been a 
misnomer, making the Collins court’s repeated references to the term 
unfortunately misleading.227 
At bottom, Collins stands for the proposition that the present-value 
discount rate ought to be an inflation rate that can potentially be adjusted to 
compensate for administrative costs. Here, then, is an example of a pre-Till 
decision that conceptualized the discount rate as one that ought to 
223. Id. at 845–46. 
224. Id. at 846. 
225. Id. at 847. 
226. See id. at 847 n.7 ("[T]he enhancement above a risk-free discount factor is more in 
the nature of an extra payment to compensate the creditor for administration and transaction 
costs rather than to compensate him for the possibility of default in the scheduled plan 
payments."). In rejecting the coerced-loan approach, the Till plurality deemed the recovery 
of transaction costs through the present-value discount rate to be inappropriate. Till v. SCS 
Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 477 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). And, as argued 
above, compensation for such costs should occur pursuant to other Code procedures. Supra 
notes 207–16 and accompanying text. 
227. See, e.g., In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842, 846, 847 & nn.7–8 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) 
(making repeated references to the term "risk factor"), abrogated by Green Tree Fin. 
Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211 (5th Cir. 1997). 
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compensate for the risk of inflation, but not risk of nonpayment or 
opportunity cost.228  Granted, the Collins decision was subsequently 
abrogated by the Fifth Circuit.229  But the important takeaway is that a 
bankruptcy court recognized the relevance of the Court’s precedent in 
Timbers for purposes of conducting present-value analysis, a precedent 
whose implications the Court failed to appreciate when deciding Till.230 
It may be argued that reliance on Timbers is an insufficient basis to 
exclude compensation for opportunity cost from the present-value calculus. 
After all, that opportunity cost is not an "interest in property" that must be 
protected does not mean that opportunity cost should not be recovered in 
another context. In other words, it could plausibly constitute a component 
of the discount rate notwithstanding the Court’s views on adequate-
protection compensation. But even if one accepts the argument that 
Timbers is inapposite for purposes of present-value analysis, courts have 
repeatedly declined to compensate creditors for opportunity cost when they 
have asserted their entitlement thereto on the basis that such cost should be 
allowed as an administrative expense constituting an actual, necessary cost 
and expense of preserving the debtor’s estate.231  Accordingly, using the 
228. In this regard, Rasmussen goes too far in his assertion that "Justice Thomas came 
up with an argument . . . adopted by no court." Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 326. 
229. Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 211 
(5th Cir. 1997), overruled by Drive Fin. Servs., L.P. v. Jordan, 521 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2008). 
Nonetheless, it is clear that, prior to Till, at least one court had concluded that the present-
value discount rate should not compensate for default risk. 
230. This failure is perhaps not that surprising. The Court is generally viewed to lack 
competence in deciding bankruptcy cases. Schwartz, supra note 49, at 105, 116. The lack 
of competence may flow from "the tendency of the Supreme Court to use the Bankruptcy 
Code as a laboratory for strict statutory construction." Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious 
Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: 
Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 215 
(2000). This tendency has had the effect of foreclosing a "pragmatic and contextual 
approach to interpretation of the Code." Id. at 214. And, of course, the Justices generally 
lack expertise in bankruptcy. For evidence that specialization (among other factors) 
produces better decision-making in the bankruptcy context, see Jonathan R. Nash & Rafael I. 
Pardo, An Empirical Investigation into Appellate Structure and the Perceived Quality of 
Appellate Review, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1745, 1803–06 (2008). 
231. E.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Dobbins, 35 F.3d 860, 868 (4th Cir. 1994); In re 
Plunkett, 191 B.R. 768, 780–81 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1995). The Code permits an entity to file 
a request for payment of an administrative expense. 11 U.S.C. § 503(a) (2006). An 
administrative expense can include "the actual, necessary costs and expenses of preserving 
the estate." Id. § 503(b)(1)(A). Pursuant to the benefit-to-the-estate test, a debt will qualify 
as an actual, necessary cost and expense of preserving the estate "if (1) it arose from a 
transaction with the bankruptcy estate and (2) directly and substantially benefitted the 
estate." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. Sunarhauserman, Inc. (In re Sunarhauserman, Inc.), 
126 F.3d 811, 816 (6th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, such administrative expenses are limited to 
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discount rate as a sub-rosa mechanism for the recovery of opportunity cost 
would impermissibly end-run the Code’s primary procedure governing 
creditor compensation for postbankruptcy liabilities. 
Once one eliminates the components of opportunity cost and risk of 
nonpayment from an interest rate, all that remains is the component that 
accounts for expected inflation.232  Accordingly, the discount rate used for 
present-value analysis should be the equivalent of an inflation rate.233  
Pursuant to this interpretation of the Code, Justice Thomas’s concurring 
opinion did not go far enough. Using the prime rate as the discount rate, as 
Justice Thomas suggested,234  would overcompensate creditors in Chapter 
13. Even the most creditworthy borrowers default and get charged 
accordingly when borrowing. In other words, the prime rate is not a 
riskless rate.235  It is also a rate that takes into account opportunity cost.236 
How, then, should a court estimate expected inflation so as to arrive at 
the appropriate discount rate for calculating present value in Chapter 13? 
One approach would be (1) to start with the current interest rate on a 
Treasury note with a maturity date roughly equivalent to the Chapter 13 
debts for which the acts giving rise to the liability occurred subsequent to the debtor’s 
bankruptcy filing. Id. at 817–19. 
232. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the three primary 
components of a traditional interest rate). 
233. It is beyond the scope of this Article to consider whether its positive theory of 
present-value analysis in Chapter 13 ought to be equally applicable in Chapter 11. On the 
one hand, the language of various Code provisions that require present-value analysis is 
similar. Compare, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (requiring that a nonconsenting holder 
of an impaired claim "receive or retain under the plan . . . property of a value, as of the 
effective date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such holder would so receive 
or retain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 . . . on such date"), with id. 
§ 1325(a)(4) (requiring for Chapter 13 plan confirmation that, with respect to the holder of 
an allowed unsecured claim, the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be 
distributed . . . is not less than the amount that would be paid . . . if the estate of the debtor 
were liquidated under chapter 7"). This may justify a uniform approach. Supra note 40. If, 
however, one takes into account contextual differences, such as the differences in the 
financial-feasibility provisions of Chapters 11 and 13, such differences may justify 
incorporating an adjustment for default risk when conducting present-value analysis in 
Chapter 11 cases. Supra Part III.B.1. For a discussion of the applicability of Till in Chapter 
11 cases see, for example, Gary W. Marsh & Matthew M. Weiss, Chapter 11 Interest Rates 
After Till, 84 AM. BANKR. L.J. 209, 212–30 (2010). 
234. Supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
235. E.g., Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 479 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality 
opinion); see also Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-America, ACA, 102 F.3d 874, 
875 (7th Cir. 1996). 
236. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the three primary 
components of a traditional interest rate). 
164 	 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 113 (2011) 
plan’s duration (a period that cannot exceed five years237),238  and (2) to 
subtract from the interest rate the real rate for the riskless cost of capital,239 
which has been estimated to be two percent.240  This figure will produce an 
estimated inflation rate that can be used as a riskless discount rate that does 
not account for opportunity cost. 
IV. The Recovery of Interest in Bankruptcy 
In further support of the argument for an inflationary discount rate, this 
Part illuminates a critical dimension to the present-value debate that has 
heretofore been ignored in the literature. In debating what discount rate 
ought to be applied in bankruptcy, courts and commentators on all sides of 
the debate have assumed that, as a descriptive matter, the core components 
of a discount rate applied in bankruptcy do not substantively differ from 
discount rates that are applied to financial flows outside of bankruptcy. 
Mechanically importing nonbankruptcy discount rates into the bankruptcy 
context, however, overlooks the fact that bankruptcy law’s response to a 
common-pool problem241  presents a set of analytically distinct 
237. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322(d), 1329(c) (providing that a Chapter 13 plan cannot 
exceed a repayment period of five years and that the five-year limitation applies to a post-
confirmation modified plan). 
238. The idea of using a Treasury-note rate as the starting point for the discount-rate 
calculus is not a novel one. For example, in a pre-Till decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit held that the discount rate used for present-value analysis in the 
Chapter 13 cramdown context "should be fixed at the rate on a United States Treasury 
instrument with a maturity equivalent to the repayment schedule under the debtor’s 
reorganization plan" and further observed that, "[b]ecause the rate on a treasury bond is 
virtually risk free, the § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) interest rate should also include a premium to 
reflect the risk to the creditor in receiving deferred payments under the reorganization plan." 
Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 1997), 
abrogated by Assoc. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 U.S. 953 (1997). 
239. The current interest rate on a government bond is a nominal rate that "includes 
expected inflation and the real cost of capital." POSNER, supra note 49, at 195 & n.11; see 
also In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 596 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting) (noting that 
Treasury rate "reflects two of the three components of a market interest rate—expected 
inflation, and ‘real’ interest"), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 
U.S. 465 (2004). Accordingly, the inflation rate is the nominal rate minus the real rate. 
240. POSNER, supra note 49, at 195; see also Richard L. Revesz, Environmental 
Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 
941, 979 (1999) ("In recent years, the economics literature has generally called for the use of 
a real discount rate of 2–3%."). 
241. See THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 16–17 
(1986) ("The single most fruitful way to think about bankruptcy is to see it as ameliorating a 
common pool problem created by a system of individual creditor remedies."). 
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considerations that demands a unique discount-rate calculus. The standard 
approach has been to conceptualize the discounting process as the payment 
of a traditional interest rate—that is, a rate that compensates for opportunity 
cost, expected inflation, and risk of default.242  While such compensation 
may be the appropriate treatment of discounting in the nonbankruptcy 
context, it does not follow, a fortiori, that a bankruptcy discount rate should 
be equally compensatory. 
The Bankruptcy Code strictly limits the instances in which a creditor 
243 may recover interest as part of its claim against the debtor’s estate. Once 
one recognizes that the Code has been quite explicit where interest recovery 
is warranted, and that the discounting process mandated by the Code is not 
articulated as the recovery of interest, it follows that wholesale 
incorporation of interest-rate components into a bankruptcy discount rate 
cannot be justified without statutory directive. In order to support this 
claim, Part IV.A sets forth the manner in which the Code generally 
excludes the recovery of interest as part of a creditor’s claim. Part IV.B 
then identifies the few instances in which the Code provides exceptions to 
this general rule. This Section thus bolsters the arguments in Part III for 
why discounting cash flows in consumer bankruptcy cases ought to be 
conceptually different from the discounting of nonbankruptcy cash flows. 
A. The Nominal Amount of Allowed Claims 
A creditor in bankruptcy faces two pressing questions: "How do I get 
paid?" and "How much will I get paid?" The answer to the first question 
addresses the process by which a creditor may establish a claim for 
repayment from the debtor’s estate. The answer to the second question is a 
function of (1) the amount of property available for distribution to creditors 
on account of their claims, and (2) the order of claim repayment based on 
the priority of the competing claims against the debtor’s estate. Thus, claim 
repayment generally involves determination of the debtor’s liabilities and 
distribution of the debtor’s property on account of those liabilities. 
The Code broadly defines a claim as a "right to payment, whether or 
not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, 
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, 
242. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing the three primary 
components of a traditional interest rate). 
243. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2006) (providing general rule that a claim will be 
disallowed "to the extent that . . . such claim is for unmatured interest"). 
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secured, or unsecured."244  Notwithstanding this broad definition, the 
Code generally circumscribes repayment to those creditors whose right 
to payment arose pre-petition (i.e., prior to the debtor’s bankruptcy 
filing).245  Only a creditor may file a proof of claim,246  and the Code 
defines a creditor as an "entity that has a claim against the debtor that 
arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the 
debtor."247  Given that the commencement of a voluntary case 
constitutes an order for relief,248  and given that the filing of a petition 
commences a bankruptcy case,249  claim repayment in bankruptcy 
primarily focuses on sorting out a debtor’s prebankruptcy liabilities.250 
Once a creditor has ascertained that it has a claim against the 
debtor, the allowance of the claim must be addressed given that 
distributions from a debtor’s estate are made to allowed claims.251  
Absent objection by a party in interest, the filing of a proof of claim 
creates a presumption of its allowance—a presumption that extends both 
244. Id. § 101(5)(A). 
245. A debtor voluntarily commences a bankruptcy case by filing a petition. Id. 
§ 301(a). Accordingly, it is common to describe the period of time leading up to the filing of 
a bankruptcy petition as "pre-petition" and the period of time following the filing of the 
petition as "post-petition." 
246. Id. § 501(a). If a creditor fails to file a proof of claim, the possibility exists that 
others may file the claim on the creditor’s behalf. Id. § 501(b), (c). 
247. Id. § 101(10). 
248. Id. § 301(b). 
249. Supra note 245. 
250. See JACKSON, supra note 241, at 34 ("Bankruptcy law should determine who are 
owners of the [debtor’s] assets, in the sense of having rights against them, at the moment the 
bankruptcy petition is filed."). There are certain instances in which the Code treats a post-
petition claim as a pre-petition claim. E.g., 11 U.S.C. § 502(g), (h), (i); id. § 1305(a), (b). 
Additionally, entities who incur expenses in connection with the administration of a debtor’s 
estate may seek repayment of their administrative expenses from the estate. Id. § 503(a). 
The court may allow such administrative expenses. Id. § 503(b). If they are allowed, the 
expenses will be granted priority status, and the entity will be allowed to obtain repayment 
from the debtor’s estate on account of the priority status of the expense. Id. §§ 507(a)(2), 
726(a)(1), 1322(a)(2). Interestingly, the Code provisions from Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 
pursuant to which an entity with an administrative expense would seek repayment from the 
debtor’s estate reference distribution only to claims entitled to priority under Code § 507. 
Id. §§ 726(a)(1), 1322(a)(2). Although a claim entitled to priority under Code § 507(a) is 
distinct from an expense entitled to priority under that section, administrative expense 
claimants routinely participate in distribution of property from the debtor’s estate. The 
logical conclusion must be that Congress inadvertently failed to reference the term 
"expenses" in Code §§ 726 and 1322. 
251. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 726(a), 1322(a)(2), 1325(a)(4), 1325(a)(5) (providing for 
distribution to various types of allowed claims). 
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to the validity and amount of the claim.252  In the event of an objection, 
the court will be called upon to determine the amount of the claim as of 
the petition date.253  Various grounds exist for lodging an objection to a 
creditor’s claim for repayment.254  Critical for purposes of this Article’s 
positive theory of present-value analysis is the extent to which the 
Bankruptcy Code allows repayment of unmatured claims. 
As previously mentioned, the Code’s definition of claim includes 
any unmatured right to payment.255  Accordingly, unless the Code 
provides a basis for disallowing an unmatured right to payment, a 
creditor’s claim for such an amount will be allowed. The Code 
generally does not allow objection to a claim on the basis that the claim 
is unmatured.256  The stark exception to this rule is that, to the extent a 
claim is for unmatured interest, the claim will be disallowed.257  From 
these two rules emerges the proposition that "bankruptcy operates as the 
acceleration of the principal amount of all claims against the debtor."258 
Accordingly, the Code establishes a simple baseline for the nominal 
amount a creditor may seek to recover in bankruptcy (the "nominal- 
amount baseline"): 	all principal amounts, whether matured or 
252. See id. § 502(a) ("A claim or interest, proof of which is filed under section 501 of 
this title, is deemed allowed, unless a party in interest . . . objects."); FED. R. BANKR. P. 
3001(f) ("A proof of claim executed and filed in accordance with these rules shall constitute 
prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claim."). For a discussion of how the 
Code’s broad definition of "claim" and the presumption regarding claim allowance facilitate 
the expeditious and efficient resolution of creditor claims against the debtor, see Rafael I. 
Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge 
Litigation, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 179, 185–87 (2009). 
253. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (providing that, upon objection to a claim, "the court . . . 
shall determine the amount of such claim . . . as of the date of the filing of the petition"). 
254. Id. § 502(b)(1)–(9). 
255. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing the Code’s definition of 
"claim"). 
256. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(1) (providing for disallowance of a claim to the extent 
"such claim is unenforceable against the debtor and property of the debtor, under any 
agreement or applicable law for a reason other than because such claim is contingent or 
unmatured" (emphasis added)); see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 62 (1978) (stating that 
"[a]ll . . . unmatured claims are to be liquidated by the bankruptcy court in order to afford the 
debtor complete bankruptcy relief"), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5848; H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-595, at 352 (1977) (same), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6308. 
257. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2). 
258. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 63, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5849; H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-595, at 353, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6309. 
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unmatured,259  and all amounts for matured interest;260  but not amounts 
for unmatured interest.261  
B. Deviations from the Nominal-Amount Baseline 
The nominal-amount baseline for claim repayment is critically 
important because it establishes the backdrop against which to evaluate the 
manner in which the Code may alter the baseline in specific contexts. The 
Code section regarding claim allowance is a section of general 
applicability, one that will have uniform application regardless of the 
operative Code chapter under which a debtor files for relief (e.g., Chapter 7 
or Chapter 13).262  Put another way, unless a contrary Code section 
supplements or displaces the principles encapsulated in the nominal-amount 
baseline, that baseline dictates the amount of repayment that may be 
demanded by a creditor in bankruptcy.263  
259. For purposes of simplicity, the nominal-amount baseline set forth in this Article 
applies to garden-variety claims and ignores special instances in which particular claims for 
either matured or unmatured principal amounts will be disallowed. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. 
§ 502(b)(3), (b)(5). 
260. See id. (providing that the definition of claim includes a matured right to 
payment); id. § 502(b)(2) (listing grounds for disallowance of claim and making no 
reference to matured interest); see also 124 CONG. REC. 32,401 (1978) (statement of Rep. 
Edwards) ("The House amendment deletes a provision following Section 726(a)(6) of the 
Senate amendment providing that the term ‘claim’ includes interest due owed before the date 
of the filing of the petition as unnecessary since a right to payment for interest due is a right 
to payment which is within the definition of ‘claim’ . . . ."), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
5963, 6459. 
261. See United States v. Victor, 121 F.3d 1383, 1387 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Section 502(b) 
does not simply prohibit certain creditors from filing a proof of claim for post-petition 
interest; it prohibits those creditors from collecting the interest from the bankruptcy estate."). 
262. Code § 502, which governs the allowance of claims, is set forth in Chapter 5 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, a chapter whose provisions apply throughout the Code. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 103(a); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 28, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5814; H.R. REP. 
NO. 95-595, at 316, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6273. 
263. This approach in setting forth a positivist account of claim repayment in 
bankruptcy is consistent with the manner in which the Supreme Court has sought to interpret 
the Bankruptcy Code. United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Inc., 
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988). In Timbers, the Court stated the following: 
Statutory construction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem 
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory 
scheme—because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that 
makes its meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings 
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law. 
Id. (citations omitted). The Court’s opinion in Timbers was the first majority opinion in a 
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If deviations from the nominal-amount baseline are to be properly 
understood, it becomes necessary to deconstruct what disallowance of 
unmatured interest entails. The interest a creditor charges a debtor 
primarily consists of three components: (1) opportunity cost, (2) a premium 
for risk of default, and (3) a premium for expected inflation.264  In light of 
this, disallowance of unmatured interest as part of a creditor’s claim 
generally translates into exclusion from the nominal-amount baseline of 
unmatured amounts relating to opportunity cost, risk of default, and 
expected inflation. Without a Code section that states otherwise, these are 
liabilities for which estate property will not be held accountable. 
The question arises as to when, if ever, the Code deviates from the 
nominal-amount baseline. Only five Code sections—Code §§ 506(b), 
362(d)(3)(B)(ii), 726(a)(5), 1222(b)(11), and 1322(b)(10)—authorize, in a 
formalistic sense, the payment of unmatured interest to a creditor.265  As a 
bankruptcy case authored by Justice Scalia, an opinion that was unanimous. Morrison, 
supra note 49, at 41. 
264. See supra note 49 (discussing the three primary components of a traditional 
interest rate). 
265. While the Code’s present-value-analysis provisions may be characterized as 
essentially authorizing the payment of interest, it will become clear from the discussion that 
follows that such a characterization is imprecise and obfuscates analysis of the nominal-
amount baseline and clear deviations therefrom. See supra Part III.A (discussing Chapter 13 
present-value-analysis provisions). For this reason, the Article excludes these additional 
provisions from the group of Code sections that formalistically authorize the recovery of 
interest by a creditor. 
There is another provision that arguably should be included within the group of Code 
sections authorizing deviation from the nominal-amount baseline. Code § 101(14A) defines 
the term "domestic support obligation," in relevant part, as "a debt that accrues before, on, or 
after the date of the order for relief in a case under this title, including interest that accrues 
on that debt as provided under applicable nonbankruptcy law notwithstanding any other 
provision of this title." 	11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) (emphasis added). 	The phrase 
"notwithstanding any other provision of this title" possibly suggests that the specific 
definition of "domestic support obligation" ought to trump the rules for claim allowance set 
forth in Code § 502, a provision of general applicability. See Busic v. United States, 446 
U.S. 398, 406 (1980) ("[A] more specific statute will be given precedence over a more 
general one, regardless of their temporal sequence."); supra note 262 (discussing the general 
applicability of Code § 502). On this view (the "primacy view"), the general rule that a 
claim will not be allowed to the extent it is for unmatured interest would be trumped by the 
directive that a debt constituting a domestic support obligation is to include unmatured 
interest. 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2). But if that is true, then one would have to accept that the 
definition also trumps the rule set forth in Code § 502(b)(5), which disallows a claim to the 
extent that it is an unmatured domestic support obligation. Id. §§ 502(b)(5), 523(a)(5). 
Accordingly, the primacy view would render Code § 502(b)(5) a nullity. If Congress had 
intended that result, however, the logical approach would have been to repeal Code 
§ 502(b)(5). Because it did not, one might conclude that Congress did not intend the 
definition for domestic support obligation to supplant the rules governing claim allowance 
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descriptive matter, these sections can be categorized according to two 
attributes (the "baseline-deviation attributes"): (1) whether the section has 
been expressly framed as one regarding the allowance of interest, and 
(2) whether the section is set forth in a chapter of general applicability. The 
first criterion signifies express recognition by the Code that a creditor’s 
claim can be augmented to include unmatured interest, thereby increasing 
the nominal amount of the claim. This will have implications for the 
treatment that may be afforded to the claim by other Code sections 
centering on the allowed amount of a claim, such as the Chapter 13 
confirmation thresholds for claim repayment.266  The second criterion 
signifies the policy choice to allow recovery of interest regardless of 
context (e.g., liquidation under Chapter 7 or rehabilitation under Chapter 
13).267  When considered jointly, these criteria provide a metric against 
which to evaluate the Code’s statutory design for the recovery of interest. 
1. Allowance of Accrued Post-Petition Interest on 
Oversecured Pre-Petition Claims—Code § 506(b) 
The first section authorizing payment of unmatured interest to a 
creditor satisfies both of the baseline-deviation attributes—that is, the 
section is expressly framed in terms of the allowance of interest and is set 
forth in a chapter of general applicability. Code § 506(b) provides that, 
(the "nonprimacy view"). Instead, Congress may have included the phrase "notwithstanding 
any other provision of this title" to clarify that one must account for a debtor’s accrued and 
unaccrued liability for a domestic support obligation when considering the scope of a 
debtor’s substantive entitlements under the Code, even though such unaccrued liability is to 
be ignored for purposes of claim repayment through the bankruptcy process. See, e.g., id. 
§ 362(b)(2)(B) (providing that the automatic stay does not prohibit collection of a domestic 
support obligation from the debtor’s property); id. § 522(c)(1) (providing that a debtor’s 
exempt property remains liable during or after the bankruptcy case for any debt that is a 
domestic support obligation). 
This Article considers the nonprimacy view to produce a more coherent and pragmatic 
interpretation to the Code. As such, the definitional provision for domestic support 
obligation is not included within the group of Code sections authorizing deviation from the 
nominal-amount baseline. For a decision that directly supports the nonprimacy view, see In 
re Hernandez, No. 07-40470-R, 2007 WL 3998301, at *2–3 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Nov. 15, 
2007). For a decision that indirectly supports the primacy view, but fails to discuss the 
general rules for claim allowance, see In re Reid, No. 06-50147, 2006 WL 2077572, at *1–2 
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. July 19, 2006). 
266. See supra Part II.A (discussing Chapter 13 confirmation thresholds). 
267. See supra notes 262–63 and accompanying text (discussing the circumstances 
under which deviation from the nominal-amount baseline for claim repayment is permitted). 
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"[t]o the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the 
value of which, after any recovery under [§ 506(c)], is greater than the 
amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the holder of such claim, 
interest on such claim."268  The Code specifies that the nominal amount of 
an allowed secured claim is calculated by comparing (1) the amount of the 
allowed claim to (2) the value of the collateral securing the claim: The 
allowed secured claim will be equal to the lesser of the allowed claim or the 
value of the collateral.269  Pursuant to Code § 506(b)’s directive, only 
holders of allowed oversecured claims (i.e., allowed claims secured by 
collateral whose value exceeds the amount of the claim) are entitled to 
augment the nominal amount of their allowed claims with unmatured 
interest.270  This entitlement is an "unqualified" right that exists even in the 
absence of an agreement between the creditor and the debtor for the 
recovery of interest.271  Accordingly, the estate’s liability to holders of 
oversecured claims will include liability for amounts relating to opportunity 
272 cost, risk of default, and expected inflation. 
268. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (emphasis added). As a provision from Chapter 5 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, § 506(b) is a provision of general applicability. Supra note 262. Code 
§ 506(c) authorizes the trustee to surcharge the property securing an allowed secured claim 
for certain expenses incurred in the preservation or disposition of such property, but only to 
the extent of the benefit provided to the holder of the claim. Id. § 506(c). 
269. See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (providing rule for determining the secured status of an 
allowed claim). In those instances where the amount of the allowed claim exceeds the value 
of the collateral securing the claim, the creditor will have an allowed unsecured claim to the 
extent that the allowed claim exceeds the collateral. Id. Accordingly, the Code bifurcates an 
allowed undersecured claim into an allowed secured claim and an allowed unsecured claim. 
Barash v. Pub. Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 68 
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5854; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 356 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6312. 
270. Of course, the claim can be augmented only to the extent that the allowed claim is 
oversecured and only as the unmatured interest accrues. The rate at which post-petition 
interest allowed under Code § 506(b) accrues has been observed to fall within the discretion 
of the court. In re Southland Corp., 160 F.3d 1054, 1058–60 (5th Cir. 1998); In re Milham, 
141 F.3d 420, 423 (2d Cir. 1998); In re Terry Ltd. P’ship, 27 F.3d 241, 243 (7th Cir. 1994). 
In Chapter 13, recovery of unmatured interest pursuant to Code § 506(b) is limited to the 
period of time beginning on the petition date and ending of the date of confirmation of the 
debtor’s repayment plan. Telfair v. First Union Mortg. Corp., 216 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th 
Cir. 2000). 
271. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241 (1989). 
272. In Chapter 13 cases, the Code arguably carves out an exception for the allowance 
of interest under Code § 506(b) for holders of allowed claims secured by certain types of 
purchase money security interests. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a). Code § 1325(a) provides as 
follows: 
For purposes of [§ 1325(a)(5)], section 506 shall not apply to a claim 
described in that paragraph if the creditor has a purchase money security interest 
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2. Monthly Interest Payments to Single-Asset-Real-Estate 
Creditors—Code § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii) 
The second section satisfies only one of the baseline-deviation 
attributes: It is not expressly framed as authorizing the allowance of 
interest, but it is a generally applicable section. For a creditor of a debtor 
with a single asset real estate (SARE)273  whose claim is secured by the real 
estate, Code § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii) authorizes a court to grant relief to the 
creditor from the automatic stay274  if the debtor fails to commence monthly 
payments (within a specified time period) to the creditor that "are in an 
amount equal to interest at the then applicable nondefault contract rate of 
interest on the value of the creditor’s interest in the real estate."275  While 
the Code creates an entitlement for recovery of interest (i.e., amounts 
relating to opportunity cost, risk of default, and expected inflation) by a 
SARE creditor, it does not authorize such a creditor to augment the nominal 
amount of its allowed claim. 
3. Payment of Post-Petition Interest Accrued on 
Chapter 7 Pre-Petition Claims—Code § 726(a)(5) 
The third section satisfies neither of the baseline-deviation attributes— 
that is, it neither is expressly framed as authorizing the allowance of interest 
nor is it a generally applicable section. Code § 726(a)(5) specifies that, in a 
Chapter 7 case, allowed unsecured claims (in addition to certain allowed 
secured claims for nonpecuniary loss) that have been fully repaid from 
estate property will also receive payment of interest at the legal rate from 
securing the debt that is the subject of the claim, the debt was incurred within 
the 910-day [period] preceding the date of the filing of the petition, and the 
collateral for that debt consists of a motor vehicle . . . acquired for the personal 
use of the debtor, or if collateral for that debt consists of any other thing of 
value, if the debt was incurred during the 1-year period preceding that filing. 
Id.; see also, e.g., In re Leath, 389 B.R. 494, 499 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2008) (concluding that 
the language of Code § 1325(a)’s hanging paragraph is broad enough to preclude the 
recovery of post-petition interest by oversecured creditors under Code § 506(b)). 
273. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (defining SARE, in relevant part, as "real property 
constituting a single property or project . . . which generates substantially all of the gross 
income of a debtor . . . and on which no substantial business is being conducted by a debtor 
other than the business of operating the real property"). 
274. See supra notes 173–76 and accompanying text (discussing the automatic stay). 
275. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii). 
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the petition date,276  provided that estate funds remain for distribution.277 
Like Code § 362(d)(3)(B)(ii), Code § 726(a)(5) creates an entitlement for 
recovery of interest but does not authorize augmentation of the nominal 
amount of the creditor’s allowed claim.278  Although Code § 726(a)(5) is a 
specific section that, as a formal matter, applies only in Chapter 7 cases,279 
the section is indirectly incorporated into cases under Chapters 11, 12, and 
13 for purposes of ascertaining the amount of property that must be 
distributed to allowed unsecured claims in order for a court to confirm a 
debtor’s repayment plan.280  Specifically, if an allowed unsecured claim 
would have received payment of interest at the legal rate from the petition 
date in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation, that amount must be taken into 
account in calculating whether a debtor’s repayment plan makes a sufficient 
distribution to the allowed unsecured claim.281  
276. Id. § 726(a)(5). 
277. See id. § 726(a), (b) (establishing order of distribution of estate property in 
Chapter 7 cases to various classes of claimants and requiring distribution to be made within 
each class on a pro rata basis); see also S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 97 (1978), (stating that Code 
§ 726(a)(5) interest "will be paid from the estate only if and to the extent that a surplus of 
assets would otherwise remain for return to the debtor at the close of the case"), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5883. 
278. See In re Dow Corning Corp., 244 B.R. 678, 685 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1999) 
("Properly understood, . . . interest under § 726(a)(5) is paid on an allowed claim . . . rather 
than as an allowed claim."). 
279. See 11 U.S.C. § 103(b) ("Subchapters I and II of chapter 7 of this title apply only 
in a case under such chapter."). 
280. Pawlowic, supra note 39, at 156. 
281. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(7), 1225(a)(4), 1325(a)(4) (creating confirmation 
threshold focusing on the amount that would have been distributed in a hypothetical Chapter 
7 liquidation); see also, e.g., Rice v. Dunbar (In re Rice), 357 B.R. 514, 518 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2006) (applying Code § 726(a)(5) in a Chapter 12 case); Groundhog, Inc. v. San Joaquin 
Estates, Inc. (In re San Joaquin Estates, Inc.), 64 B.R. 534, 536 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) 
(applying Code § 726(a)(5) in a Chapter 11 case); In re Hoskins, 405 B.R. 576, 587–89 
(Bankr. N.D.W. Va. 2009) (applying Code § 726(a)(5) in a Chapter 13 case). It has been 
suggested that reference to Code § 726(a)(5) in applying the "best interest test" would be 
inappropriate because the test envisions a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation that occurs 
immediately on the effective date of the plan, thus precluding the accrual of interest. In re 
Martin, 17 B.R. 924, 925 (N.D. Ill. 1982). But this view fails to consider that Code 
§ 726(a)(5) provides for the payment of interest at the legal rate from the petition date and 
that the effective date of the plan can be subsequent to the petition date, thereby creating an 
opportunity for the accrual of interest prior to the hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. Supra 
note 36. 
Interestingly, although certain allowed secured penalty claims for nonpecuniary loss are 
entitled to receive the payment of interest at the legal rate from the petition date, if sufficient 
funds exist, the Code does not take this into account in determining whether such claims 
receive adequate distribution in Chapters 12 and 13. 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(4)–(5), (b). In 
those instances where the debtor proposes to retain the property securing a holder’s claim 
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Importantly, it should be noted that use of the term "legal rate" in Code 
§ 726(a)(5) has been interpreted to mandate application of the postjudgment 
interest rate for federal cases,282  which does not compensate for risk of 
default.283  If this view is correct, then one witnesses an instance in which 
Congress has expressed a preference for the recovery of interest at a risk-
free rate. It should not be so hard to imagine, then, that Congress may 
similarly have intended that the discount rate for present-value analysis be 
risk free. 
4. Payment of Post-Petition Interest Accrued on 
Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 Pre-Petition Nondischargeable 
Claims—Code §§ 1222(b)(11) and 1322(b)(10) 
Like the third section, the fourth and fifth sections satisfy neither of 
the baseline-deviation attributes—that is, they are neither expressly framed 
as authorizing the allowance of interest nor are they generally applicable 
sections. Code §§ 1222(b)(11) and 1322(b)(10) relate to provisions that 
may, but need not be included, in Chapter 12 and Chapter 13 repayment 
plans.284  Each provision permits a Chapter 12 or Chapter 13 plan, 
respectively, to provide for the payment of post-petition interest that 
accrues on debts that are not discharged upon completion of the plan, but 
only if the plan provides to pay in full all allowed claims and the debtor has 
sufficient disposable income to make the interest payments.285  Prior to 
enactment of the Code, the Supreme Court had held that a debtor remains 
and where the holder of the allowed secured claim has not accepted the debtor’s Chapter 12 
or Chapter 13 plan, a court must ascertain whether the plan makes a sufficient distribution of 
property to the holder of the allowed secured claim. In making the determination, the focus 
is on the allowed amount of the secured claim rather than the amount that the holder of the 
claim would have received in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. 	Id. 
§§ 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii), 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii). If the holder of the allowed secured penalty claim 
for nonpecuniary loss is not oversecured, it is not entitled to augment its allowed claim with 
amounts for unmatured interest. Supra notes 269–72 and accompanying text. Thus, the 
holder of the claim will not be compensated for the interest that it would have received in a 
Chapter 7 case. If the holder of such a claim is undersecured, however, the holder has both 
an allowed secured claim and an allowed unsecured claim. Supra note 269. Thus, the 
holder would be compensated for the interest that it would have received on account of its 
allowed unsecured claim in a Chapter 7 case. 
282. Onink v. Cardelucci (In re Cardelucci), 285 F.3d 1231, 1233 (9th Cir. 2002). 
283. Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436–37 (7th Cir. 
1989). 
284. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(b)(11), 1322(b)(10). 
285. Id. 
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personally liable following a bankruptcy discharge for post-petition interest 
on nondischargeable tax debt.286  Under the Code, courts have continued to 
follow the Court’s pre-Code precedent, holding that interest on 
nondischargeable debts continues to accrue during bankruptcy and that the 
debtor will remain personally liable for such debt postbankruptcy.287 
Accordingly, in order to maximize the fresh start provided by discharge, a 
debtor will have an incentive to eliminate, to the extent possible, any 
nondischargeable debt (including nondischargeable accrued interest) prior 
to exiting bankruptcy.288 
C. The Implications of the Nominal-Amount Baseline 
With little rhyme or reason, the following picture emerges of the 
special instances in which the Code deviates from the nominal-amount 
baseline such that a creditor may recover unmatured interest: 
• Holders of allowed oversecured claims will generally be 
allowed to augment the allowed amount of their claims to 
include unmatured interest, subject to the following exceptions: 
o Holders of allowed oversecured claims secured by 
certain purchase-money security interests will not be 
entitled to such recovery in Chapter 13.289 
o Holders of allowed oversecured penalty claims for 
nonpecuniary loss in Chapter 7 cases will be allowed to 
286. Bruning v. United States, 376 U.S. 358, 363 (1964). 
287. See, e.g., Leeper v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency (In re Leeper), 49 F.3d 
98, 105 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that, in a Chapter 13 case, post-petition interest can continue 
to accrue on a nondischargeable student loan); Fullmer v. United States (In re Fullmer), 962 
F.2d 1463, 1468 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Interest that accrues postpetition on a nondischargeable 
prepetition tax debt survives bankruptcy as a personal liability."), abrogated on other 
grounds by Raleigh v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15 (2000); Burns v. United States (In 
re Burns), 887 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e conclude that the post-petition 
interest on a nondischargeable tax debt is nondischargeable."); Hanna v. United States (In re 
Hanna), 872 F.2d 829, 831 (8th Cir. 1989) (same). It should be noted that this rule 
contradicts the manner in which the Code’s legislative history generally characterizes the 
accrual of post-petition interest—specifically, that such interest does not accrue. S. REP. NO. 
95-989, at 63 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5849; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 
353 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6309. 
288. See Pardo & Lacey, supra note 175, at 417–18 ("Any exception to discharge, of 
course, encroaches upon the fresh start principle, and the threat looms that, when such 
incursion is overextensive, the debtor will fail to reintegrate into society as an economically 
productive individual." (footnote omitted)). 
289. Supra note 272. 
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augment their claims to include unmatured interest but 
will be automatically subordinated to the claims of 
holders of priority and nonpriority unsecured claims, 
with the result that recovery of interest will occur only 
if there are sufficient proceeds from property of the 
estate to make distributions to the class of subordinated 
penalty claims (and even then, the distribution could be 
less than 100% of the claim).290 
• Holders of claims secured by a single asset real estate will not 
be allowed to augment their allowed claims but will be allowed 
to recover monthly interest payments if the debtor desires to 
avoid having the court grant relief to the SARE creditor from 
the automatic stay. 
• In Chapter 7 cases, holders of allowed unsecured claims and 
holders of allowed secured penalty claims for nonpecuniary 
loss will not be entitled to augment their claims to include 
unmatured interest but will be entitled to receive payment of 
interest at the legal rate from the petition date if there are 
sufficient estate funds,291  which is highly unlikely.292 
• In cases under Chapters 11, 12, and 13, distributions to holders 
of allowed unsecured claims must account for any payment of 
290. In a Chapter 13 case, the Code has no such automatic subordination provision. As 
such, the possibility arises that the debtor will have to make distributions on account of a 
claim that otherwise may not have received a distribution in Chapter 7. This has the 
potential to create a hurdle to plan confirmation if the debtor does not have sufficient income 
to make the required distribution to the holder of an allowed nonpecuniary-loss penalty 
claim that is secured. 
291. Note that nothing about the Code’s automatic subordination provision in Chapter 7 
for nonpecuniary-loss penalty claims prohibits a holder of such a claim that is oversecured 
from availing itself of the entitlement to augment the allowed claim to include unmatured 
interest. The subordination provision merely affects the order of distribution but does not 
affect the allowance of the creditor’s claim. Cf. In re County of Orange, 219 B.R. 543, 559 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1997) (noting that the purpose of the doctrine of equitable subordination, 
codified in 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2006), is "to reprioritize the order of allowed claims based on 
the equities of the case, rather than to allow or disallow the claim in the first instance" 
(emphasis added)). Accordingly, the possibility exists that, with a Chapter 7 estate where 
sufficient funds exist for payment of interest at the legal rate, the holder of a nonpecuniary-
loss penalty claim that is oversecured will recover Code § 726(a)(5) interest on Code 
§ 506(b) interest—in effect, the recovery of compound interest. In other words, because 
Code § 506(b) interest becomes part of the creditor’s allowed claim, it is essentially treated 
as "principal" upon which Code § 726(a)(5) interest can be earned. 
292. See U.S. TR. PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON CHAPTER 
7 ASSET CASES 1994 TO 2000, at 7 (2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ 
private_trustee/library/chapter07/docs/assetcases/Publicat.pdf (noting that, "[h]istorically, 
the vast majority (about 95 to 97 percent) of chapter 7 cases yield no assets"). 
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interest at the legal rate that such holders would have received 
in a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation. 
• In cases under Chapters 12 and 13, holders of allowed claims 
that are nondischargeable may receive interest payments if the 
debtor’s repayment plan so provides. 
Given the narrow set of circumstances in which the Code deviates 
from the nominal-amount baseline, it seems reasonable to conclude that the 
Code severely limits the recovery of unmatured interest—that is, amounts 
for opportunity costs, risk of default, and expected inflation—by creditors. 
It is equally important to note that the adequacy of the discount rate 
proposed in a debtor’s repayment plan is generally a question of bankruptcy 
law.293  When Congress has sought to defer to nonbankruptcy law in setting 
the appropriate discount rate, it has expressly indicated this desire.294 
Finally, the discounting process does not make any reference to the term 
"interest."295 
As evident from the outline set forth above, Congress has expressly 
provided for the recovery of interest by creditors elsewhere throughout the 
Code,296  including the payment of post-petition interest accrued on Chapter 
13 pre-petition nondischargeable claims.297  Had Congress intended 
present-value analysis to be tantamount to the recovery of garden-variety 
interest (i.e., interest that compensates for opportunity cost, expected 
293. See, e.g., Warehouse Home Furnishings Distribs., Inc. v. Richards (In re 
Richards), 106 B.R. 762, 766 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1989) (stating that the determination of 
present-value interest is determined by the Bankruptcy Code rather than by the contract 
between the debtor and the creditor). 
294. See 11 U.S.C. § 511(a) (2006) ("If any provision of this title requires . . . the 
payment of interest to enable a creditor to receive the present value of the allowed amount of 
a tax claim, the rate of interest shall be the rate determined under applicable nonbankruptcy 
law." (emphasis added)). 
295. See Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 473 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality 
opinion) (noting that Code § 1325(a)(5)(B) "does not mention the term ‘discount rate’ or the 
word ‘interest’"). Although this signpost did not go unnoticed by the plurality in Till, Justice 
Stevens nonetheless framed the issue of present-value analysis in terms of interest payments. 
See id. at 474 ("The challenge for bankruptcy courts reviewing such repayment schemes, 
therefore, is to choose an interest rate sufficient to compensate the creditor for these 
concerns."). 
296. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the manner in which the Code provides for the 
recovery of interest); see also Pawlowic, supra note 39, at 173 ("[I]t is apparent that 
Congress described the obligation to pay plan interest under the reorganization chapters in 
very different terms from the obligations to pay pendency interest under section 506(b) or 
726(a)(5)." (footnote omitted)). 
297. Supra Part IV.B.4. 
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inflation, and risk of default), one would have expected Congress to have 
explicitly said so. But it did not and has not. 
Although considerations of administrative convenience may prompt us 
to conceptualize the discounting process as nothing other than the payment 
of garden-variety interest,298  doing so infuses the Code’s statutory 
confirmation standards with a meaning that is not expressed in those 
provisions but is expressed elsewhere in the Code—namely, the recovery of 
interest (i.e., opportunity cost, expected inflation, and risk of default) 
pursuant to those Code sections permitting deviation from the nominal- 
amount baseline. 	Accordingly, courts and commentators have 
inappropriately assumed that the discount rate used for present-value 
analysis ought to be similarly compensatory. 
V. A Normative Appraisal of an Inflationary Discount Rate in 
Consumer Bankruptcy 
The remainder of this Article examines whether the doctrinal 
prescription for the application of an inflationary discount rate in 
bankruptcy is normatively desirable, ultimately concluding that it is. 
Drawing upon the work of Thomas Jackson, Part V.A examines the issue of 
whether failing to compensate creditors for opportunity cost and risk of 
default undermines bankruptcy law’s goal to give effect to nonbankruptcy 
entitlements, unless doing so interferes with the law’s attempt to overcome 
the collective-action problem of self-interested creditors acting counter to 
the interests of the creditors as a group.299  Part V.B then considers the 
extent to which an inflationary discount rate comports with the fresh-start 
principle in bankruptcy, which "captures the notion that substantive relief 
should be afforded in the form of forgiveness of existing debt, with 
relinquishment by the debtor of either existing nonexempt assets or a 
portion of future income, in order to restore the debtor to economic 
298. See Carbiener, supra note 144, at 45 ("Rather than discount the stream of 
payments to be received by the discount rate, the same result can be achieved by adding 
interest equal to the discount rate to scheduled principal payments."); Pawlowic, supra note 
39, at 170 (noting that a present-value determination can be simplified if the debtor’s plan 
proposes "the payment of a principal amount . . . plus interest at a rate equal to the rate that 
otherwise would be used to discount the payments to present value"). 
299. See JACKSON, supra note 241, at 28 ("Because the collective damage resulting 
from adhering to a right may sometimes exceed any benefit, a bankruptcy statute sometimes 
must replace nonbankruptcy rights with something else."). 
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productivity."300  Finally, Part V.C identifies the manner in which present-
value analysis implicates an administrative function that has the potential to 
undermine the optimal institutional design of bankruptcy courts, pursuant to 
which administrative and judicial functions are to be kept as separate as 
possible. The Article concludes that, not only does an inflation rate 
comport with generally held theory of bankruptcy law’s procedural and 
substantive goals, it also optimizes the statutory design of the Bankruptcy 
Code and the institutional design of the bankruptcy courts. 
A. Advancing Bankruptcy Law’s Procedural Goal 
Thomas Jackson has argued that bankruptcy law ought to respect and 
vindicate nonbankruptcy entitlements in order to avoid creating the very 
problem that bankruptcy law seeks to overcome—that is, individuals acting 
in self-interest counter to the group’s interest, such as one creditor shopping 
for the bankruptcy forum merely to gain the advantage conferred by a 
bankruptcy rule that does not recognize a competing creditor’s 
nonbankruptcy entitlement.301  An exception to this rule exists, however, if 
vindicating the nonbankruptcy entitlement interferes with bankruptcy law’s 
collectivizing goal.302  In evaluating the normative desirability of an 
inflationary discount rate in bankruptcy, one might therefore frame the 
question in the following manner: If a creditor has a nonbankruptcy 
entitlement to be compensated for risk of default and opportunity cost, does 
bankruptcy procedural theory suggest that the entitlement should be 
vindicated or give way? Arguably, sound bankruptcy policy dictates a 
disregard for a creditor’s nonbankruptcy right to be compensated for both. 
First, in considering why a creditor’s nonbankruptcy right to be 
compensated for default risk ought not to be vindicated, one should 
consider the issue from the perspective of both voluntary and involuntary 
300. Pardo & Lacey, supra note 175, at 414; see also, e.g., JACKSON, supra note 241, at 
4 (noting that "[t]he policy relating to discharge and notions of a fresh start . . . addresses the 
question of whether limits should be established on what creditors can get from their 
debtor"); William O. Douglas, Wage Earner Bankruptcies—State vs. Federal Control, 42 
YALE L.J. 591, 592–93 (1933) ("The bankruptcy power in general entails a determination of 
legislative policy on two problems[.] . . . The second problem entails primarily a 
determination of the debts from which a debtor may be discharged, the conditions if any for 
a discharge, and the grounds upon which it may be refused."). 
301. See JACKSON, supra note 241, at 20–67 (examining the determination of liabilities 
in bankruptcy in relation to the role of bankruptcy law). 
302. Supra note 299. 
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creditors. From the perspective of a voluntary creditor, that creditor’s 
nonbankruptcy right to be compensated for default risk will generally 
terminate once the borrowing debtor defaults. 	Such a creditor will 
generally extend credit to many borrowers. Some of those borrowers will 
default and others will not. If the creditor has appropriately priced the cost 
of credit, it will be able to offset the losses from defaulting borrowers with 
the gains from nondefaulting borrowers.303  Extending in bankruptcy a 
voluntary creditor’s nonbankruptcy right that has terminated would have 
the effect of impermissibly overvaluing the right relative to those of 
competing claimants—that is, by allowing the recovery of profit from a 
debtor who has defaulted, which loss should be offset by the creditor’s 
nondefaulting borrowers304—and would thus compromise the collectivizing 
goal of the bankruptcy process.305 
From the perspective of an involuntary creditor, there is the initial 
question of whether that creditor has a nonbankruptcy entitlement to 
compensation for default risk. For example, the federal postjudgment rate 
is a risk-free rate.306  For those instances where applicable nonbankruptcy 
law would entitle an involuntary creditor to recover for default risk,307  it 
303. See In re Collins, 167 B.R. 842, 847 n.7 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1994) (noting that, 
when a lending institution calculates a risk factor, "[t]hat calculation can simply be made by 
determining the expected rate of default and then factoring an enhanced interest rate charge 
so that the cost or risk of defaulting loans will be evenly spread among other loans"), 
abrogated by Green Tree Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Smithwick (In re Smithwick), 121 F.3d 
211 (5th Cir. 1997). 
304. See In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 597 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, J., dissenting) ("These 
lenders understand that a significant number of their borrowers . . . may, in fact, end up in 
bankruptcy. Yet, they continue to make high-risk loans because the money they receive 
from non-defaulting borrowers is enough to offset that risk; they would not remain in 
business otherwise."), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 
(2004); see also 1 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 5, at 262 (noting that, if a 
creditor were entitled to recover present-value interest at the nondefault contract rate, "[s]uch 
an interest rate arguably includes a calculation for profit, potentially giving the creditor more 
than it would have received had the property been foreclosed"). 
305. Cf. In re Scott, 248 B.R. 786, 793 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2000) ("[A]pplying a rate of 
interest that fully reflects risk of nonpayment—like the contract rate in the present case—to 
a secured claim amount that already includes substantial ‘risk protection’ results in a 
windfall for the secured creditor, to the detriment of unsecured creditors."). 
306. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (2006) (providing that postjudgment interest rate "shall be 
calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-  
year constant maturity Treasury yield"). 
307. See, e.g., Gorenstein Enters., Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 436 
(7th Cir. 1989) ("[W]e suggest that district judges use the prime rate for fixing prejudgment 
interest where there is no statutory interest rate. That is a readily ascertainable figure which 
provides a reasonable . . . estimate for the interest rate necessary to compensate plaintiffs . . . 
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seems reasonable to conclude that the majority of such creditors will be 
general unsecured creditors. Because an individual debtor’s risk of default 
under a Chapter 13 repayment plan will likely be uniform vis-à-vis all 
members within this class of claimants for a given case, the effect of 
vindicating the nonbankruptcy entitlement to default-risk compensation will 
be to increase the nominal amount of each creditor’s claim. But because 
the income available for distribution is limited, there will be no increase in 
the creditor’s pro-rata distribution. Accordingly, vindicating the right 
increases administrative costs without any real benefit, thus undermining 
the goal of maximizing a debtor’s estate for the benefit of all creditors. As 
such, the nonbankruptcy entitlement ought to give way. 
Second, in considering why a creditor’s nonbankruptcy right to be 
compensated for opportunity cost ought not to be vindicated, the concern 
over administrative costs is equally present. Each creditor’s opportunity 
cost will differ from that of other creditors in a given bankruptcy case. As 
such, opportunity cost will have to be calculated individually for each 
creditor. It is not difficult to imagine that, in some instances, the calculus 
will lead to litigation. The initial calculus and any subsequent litigation 
related thereto will produce administrative costs that could very well 
become intractable.308  Once again, these costs will have the effect of 
undermining bankruptcy law’s procedural goal of maximizing a debtor’s 
estate for the benefit of all creditors. To avoid this result, a nonbankruptcy 
entitlement to be compensated for opportunity cost ought not to be 
vindicated in bankruptcy.309 
for the risk of default."). 
308. See Onink v. Cardelucci (In re Cardelucci), 285 F.3d 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2002) 
("Calculating the appropriate rate and amount of interest to be paid to a myriad of investors 
has the potential to overwhelm what could otherwise be a relatively simple process pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5)."); Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 
F.3d 55, 64 (2d Cir. 1997) ("This [‘cost of funds’] approach, however, is difficult for 
bankruptcy courts to apply efficiently and inexpensively. Because individual creditors 
borrow funds at different rates, bankruptcy courts would have to determine a creditor’s cost 
of funds on a case-by-case basis."), abrogated by Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 
U.S. 953 (1997). 
309. One might go a step further and ask whether bankruptcy law ought to compensate 
creditors for expected inflation. In any given case, the inflation rate ought to be the same for 
all creditors. Thus, compensating creditors for expected inflation will increase the nominal 
amount of their claims. Because the amount of estate property available for distribution is 
fixed, however, a creditor’s pro-rata distribution will not be increased. Thus, there will be 
administrative costs with little benefit gained. This may suggest that bankruptcy law ought 
not to provide for discounting in the first instance. While this may sound unorthodox, it may 
be that the common-pool problem that bankruptcy law seeks to overcome makes bankruptcy 
a unique area of law requiring an unconventional approach. Cf. Revesz, supra note 240, at 
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B. Advancing Bankruptcy Law’s Substantive Goal 
One of the animating goals of bankruptcy law is to restore financially 
distressed debtors to economic productivity by forgiving their past debts. 
The litigation process in bankruptcy, depending on how it is structured, 
may potentially interfere with a debtor’s fresh start.310  If discounting in 
bankruptcy is structured so as to compensate a creditor for default risk and 
opportunity cost, any dispute over the appropriate rate will involve a 
calculation of these amounts. This information is more readily available to 
and more easily processed by commercially sophisticated creditors, who are 
repeat players in the system, rather than consumer debtors, who tend to be 
one-shot players. The informational asymmetry that results is one likely to 
favor creditors.311  If, on the other hand, discounting in bankruptcy is 
structured solely to account for inflation, the playing field would be leveled 
insofar as the information regarding the inflation rate is readily 
ascertainable and processed by both parties. An inflation-rate regime thus 
reduces search costs for debtors, thereby opening access to Chapter 13 
rehabilitation. Accordingly, the Article concludes that an inflation rate for 
present-value analysis enhances the prospects of debtor rehabilitation by 
eliminating undue advantages from informational asymmetries that 
987–1016 (examining environmental regulation, cost-benefit analysis, and the discounting of 
human lives; and arguing that, in the case of harms to future generations, discounting is 
ethically unjustified and thus should not be part of the regulatory process). 
As a functional matter, empirical evidence suggests that the focus in bankruptcy ought 
to be on the valuation of assets, rather than the discounting of payments. In a 2007 study, 
Timothy Fisher and Jocelyn Martel examined the sensitivity of the best-interests test to 
various assumptions about (1) discount rates, (2) probability of successful reorganization, 
(3) time required to liquidate assets, and (4) the liquidation value of assets. Fisher & Martel, 
supra note 151, at 498. The study looked at data on 180 firms that filed for reorganization 
under the Canadian Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act between 1992 and 1996, and they 
carried out best-interests tests on the data by varying the values for the aforementioned 
variables. They ultimately found that the best-interests test is sensitive only to assumptions 
about liquidation value; the test, however, is not sensitive to discount rates, the probability of 
successful reorganization, and the time required for liquidation. Fisher & Martel, supra note 
151. The findings from the study thus suggest that it is the valuation threshold that matters 
most. If valuation drives recovery in bankruptcy, rather than a discount rate, bankruptcy law 
ought to focus on the former rather than the latter. Doing so will eliminate a layer of 
administrative costs and have the positive effect of maximizing returns to creditors. 
310. See, e.g., Pardo & Lacey, supra note 252, at 232 (stating that empirical evidence 
"suggests that undue hardship discharge litigation improperly curtails access to justice for 
student-loan debtors who legitimately need relief from their financial distress"). 
311. Justice Stevens’s plurality opinion in Till recognizes the informational asymmetry 
inherent in a present-value-analysis dispute between a creditor and an individual debtor. Till 
v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 484–85 (2004) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion). 
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generally favor creditors and by reducing search costs for consumer 
debtors.312  As such, the doctrinal prescription suggested in this Article 
comports with generally held notions of what bankruptcy law ought to do 
substantively. 
C. Optimizing Statutory and Institutional Design 
Nondelegation doctrine holds that Congress violates the constitutional 
principle of separation of powers when it delegates excessive authority to 
agencies.313  The delegation is not excessive, however, if Congress supplies 
an "intelligible principle" that guides and constrains the delegated 
14 authority.3 	In other words, Congress must make the foundational 
decisions about statutory policy. Margaret Lemos has persuasively argued 
that Congress delegates to courts in the same fashion as it does to 
administrative agencies and that, as such, those delegations ought to be 
examined to see whether they run afoul of the nondelegation doctrine.315 
Moreover, even if the delegation is permissible, the question arises as to 
who is the more appropriate delegate—that is, a court or an agency.316  In 
evaluating the normative desirability of an inflation rate for discounting in 
consumer bankruptcy, one might therefore examine Congress’s decision to 
delegate (a question of statutory design) as well as Congress’s choice of 
delegate (a question of institutional characteristics). 
312. In the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Till, Judge Rovner’s dissenting opinion noted 
that an overcompensatory discount rate is "inconsistent with the fresh start that Chapter 13 
was intended to provide to debtors." In re Till, 301 F.3d 583, 593 (7th Cir. 2002) (Rovner, 
J., dissenting), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004). 
313. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) ("In a delegation 
challenge, the constitutional question is whether the statute has delegated legislative power 
to the agency."). 
314. Id. 
315. See Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes 
and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 408 (2008) ("Just as agencies 
exercise a lawmaking function when they fill in the gaps left by broad delegations of power, 
so too do courts. And, to the extent that lawmaking by agencies triggers constitutional 
anxieties about the proper allocation of power . . . , so too should delegated lawmaking by 
courts." (footnote omitted)); see also Scott Baker & Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Penalty 
Default Canon, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 663, 665 (2004) (developing the "Penalty Default 
Canon [which] requires courts to declare responsibility-shifting statutory provisions 
unconstitutional delegations of legislative authority"). 
316. See Lemos, supra note 315, at 469–75 (analyzing the positive and negative effects 
of courts serving as delegates). 
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First, consider the question of statutory design. An open-ended 
instruction by Congress to the courts without more, as exists under the 
current arrangement, may constitute an impermissible delegation. The 
positive theory provided in Part III of this Article is one that may insulate 
the current statutory design from such an attack. One might argue that the 
guideposts throughout the Code provide the requisite "intelligible principle" 
that would make the delegation nonexcessive. 
But even if a nondelegation challenge to the current arrangement is 
unlikely, open-ended statutory design in the discounting context raises 
implementation concerns as a result of anchoring effects. Research shows 
that, when individuals make estimates, they will often rely on an initial 
value to anchor their final estimate.317  An anchor can influence judgment, 
even if the anchor does not convey useful information.318  In an 
experimental study in 2004 involving 113 bankruptcy judges (after the 
Supreme Court had decided Till), the judges were asked to set the discount 
rate for cramdown payments to a secured creditor in a hypothetical Chapter 
13 proceeding.319  Judges were instructed to follow the Till plurality’s 
"prime-plus" approach.320  The control group was not told the contract 
interest rate, which was higher than the prime rate, whereas the 
experimental group was told the contract rate.321  At the mean, the 
experimental group set a statistically significantly higher discount rate than 
22 the control group.3  
As a matter of statutory design, asking courts to account solely for 
expected inflation provides a prophylactic approach toward overcoming 
anchoring effects. Recall that the doctrinal prescription set forth in this 
23 Article calls for a downward departure from the Treasury-note rate.3  
Assuming that knowledge of a contract rate has an anchoring effect, it will 
be to minimize the downward departure. Given that the Treasury-note rate 
is lower than the prime rate, the detrimental effect of anchoring will be 
mitigated. 
317. Jeffrey J. Rachlinksi, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy 
Judge’s Mind, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1233 (2006). 
318. Id. 
319. Id. at 1234. 
320. Id. at 1234–35. 
321. Id. at 1235. 
322. Id. For further discussion regarding anchoring effects in the context of Till, see 
Schwartz, supra note 49, at 113. 
323. Supra notes 238–40 and accompanying text. 
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Second, consider the question of institutional design. In order to get 
better administrability of present-value analysis in consumer bankruptcy, 
we ought to use a discount rate that solely accounts for expected inflation— 
particularly in light of the fact that, under the current bankruptcy system, 
there exists no administrative agency with rulemaking or adjudicatory 
authority. Anything beyond an inflationary discount rate may have the 
effect of making the bankruptcy court a bad delegate for administering the 
Code’s present-value provision. If discounting in bankruptcy is required to 
account for risk of default and opportunity cost, in addition to expected 
inflation, the discount-rate calculus becomes an overly burdensome 
nonforensic determination—that is, a determination that involves prediction 
about the future course of events in administration of the bankruptcy case, 
which in turn requires the court to evaluate risks and balance competing 
risk-reward preferences among case participants.324  A court, however, is 
not well equipped to make such a determination because (1) the court does 
not have an independent investigatory arm to conduct research about future 
risk, (2) the adversary system chills collaborative exchange between parties 
in solving a forward-looking problem, and (3) the indeterminacy of the 
future makes it difficult to establish an effective legal standard.325 
Furthermore, estimating default risk and opportunity cost increases the 
complexity and cost of acquiring information that will accurately predict 
present value. This will interfere with a court’s ability to devote its 
resources to resolving disputed forensic matters, which are at the core of the 
judicial function.326  Thus, concerns over institutional design provide 
normative support for a discount rate that solely accounts for expected 
inflation.327 
324. Richard B. Levin, Towards a Model of Bankruptcy Administration, 44 S.C. L. REV. 
963, 972 (1993). 
325. Id. at 981–83. 
326. See id. at 978 ("[A]uthoritative decisions about disputed forensic matters in 
bankruptcy cases should be made in the judicial system."). For further discussion regarding 
the manner in which the statutory design of the Bankruptcy Code erodes the judicial 
function, see Rafael I. Pardo, Eliminating the Judicial Function in Consumer Bankruptcy, 81 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 471, 488–93 (2007). 
327. Cf. Rasmussen, supra note 13, at 328 ("[T]here is little to be said for any approach 
that places large information burdens on the bankruptcy court. . . . The system really is not 
designed to adjudicate the facts of each individual debtor."); Schwartz, supra note 49, at 115 
n.18 (stating that Till "needlessly increase[s] the administrative costs of consumer 
bankruptcy . . . by increasing the number of interest rate hearings"). 
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VI. Conclusion 
This Article has attempted to bring some order to the chaos that has 
characterized the law’s approach to present-value analysis in consumer 
bankruptcy. It has argued that, as a positive matter, the Bankruptcy Code 
compels application of an inflation rate when discounting future payments 
to present value. Adherence to this prescription will not only make the 
doctrine more sound, it will also further bankruptcy law’s procedural and 
substantive goals and will optimize the statutory design of the Bankruptcy 
Code and the institutional design of the bankruptcy courts. 
